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The Cape Town water crisis of 2017 to 2019 became national and international news due to 
the risk of a major metropole running out of water. What this portrayal neglects to include is 
the fact that for a significant proportion of households in the city, ‘Day Zero’ (the day the taps 
would run dry) was already a daily reality long before the onset of the drought. Traditional 
media, such as newspapers, radio broadcasts, and television broadcasts, framed the water crisis 
as the ‘great equaliser’. However, when you begin to unpack this narrative and the media 
coverage around the crisis, the idea of it being a ‘great equaliser’ quickly unravels. 
Developments prior to and during the drought reveals infrastructural inequalities and 
conditions of living that Vigh (2008) refers to as ‘chronic crisis’. That is, for the vast majority 
of the poor in Cape Town’s informal settlements, the water ‘crisis’ is experienced not as a 
singular, extraordinary event, but rather as an enduring, chronic condition which is experienced 
on a daily basis. Regarded as ‘ordinary suffering’ and unspectacular ‘slow violence’, these 
communities often have to perpetually struggle to access a basic means of survival under 
circumstances rendered invisible to a wider middle-class public. In this light, this project aims 
to show that how we understand the experience of the drought is multifaceted and tied to 
historic injustice, the presence and absence of infrastructure, and what role media – both 
traditional and social – played in the crisis. It seeks to show that the narrative of a ‘great 
equaliser’ should be problematized as crisis is not experienced homogenously. This study 
collected data by conducting in-person formal and informal interviews, doing participant 
observation, and analysing media documentation to construct an ethnography to highlight the 
varied experiences of Cape Town’s ‘Day Zero’. In the context of the Kildare Road spring, I 
highlight how the crisis did not start, nor end, with the ‘Day Zero’ campaign. Rather, it started 




Die Kaapstadse waterkrisis van 2017 tot 2019 het nasionale en internasionale nuus geword 
vanweë die risiko dat 'n groot metropool sonder water sou wees. Wat hierdie uitbeelding 
versuim om in te sluit, is die feit dat 'Dag Zero' (die dag waarop die krane droog sou raak) vir 
'n beduidende deel van die huishoudings in die stad al 'n daaglikse werklikheid was lank voor 
die aanvang van die droogte. Tradisionele media, soos koerante, radio-uitsendings en televisie-
uitsendings, het die waterkrisis omskryf as die 'groot gelykmaker'. As u egter hierdie vertelling 
en die mediadekking rondom die krisis begin uitpak, ontrafel die idee dat dit 'n 'groot 
gelykmaker' is. Ontwikkelings voor en tydens die droogte onthul infrastruktuurongelykhede en 
lewensomstandighede waarna Vigh (2008) 'chroniese krisis' noem. Dit wil sê, vir die oorgrote 
meerderheid van die armes in Kaapstad se informele nedersettings, word die waterkrisis nie as 
'n unieke, buitengewone gebeurtenis ervaar nie, maar eerder as 'n blywende, chroniese toestand 
wat daagliks ervaar word. Hierdie gemeenskappe word beskou as 'gewone lyding' en 'n 
onspektakulêre 'stadige geweld', en hulle moet voortdurend sukkel om toegang te verkry tot 'n 
basiese oorlewingsmiddel onder omstandighede wat onsigbaar is vir 'n breër middelklas-
publiek. In hierdie lig het hierdie projek ten doel om aan te toon dat die manier waarop ons die 
ervaring van die droogte verstaan, veelsydig is en gekoppel is aan historiese ongeregtigheid, 
die aanwesigheid en afwesigheid van infrastruktuur, en watter rol media - sowel tradisioneel 
as sosiaal - in die krisis gespeel het. Dit poog om aan te toon dat die vertelling van 'n 'groot 
gelykmaker' geproblematiseer moet word, aangesien krisis nie homogeen ervaar word nie. 
Hierdie studie het data versamel deur personlike formele en informele onderhoude te voer, 
waarneming van deelnemers te doen en mediadokumentasie te ontleed om 'n etnografie te 
konstrueer om die uiteenlopende ervarings van Kaapstad se 'Day Zero' uit te lig. In die konteks 
van die Kildare Road-fontein beklemtoon ek hoe die krisis nie begin of eindig met die 'Day 
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The first time I went to the Kildare Road spring was in February of 2018. It was late morning 
on a Saturday and the queue to get to the makeshift pipe where you collect water is fairly long. 
I count approximately 50 people waiting in line. The people in line vary in many ways. There 
are children, teenagers, two people wearing University of Cape Town (UCT) pullovers. There 
are older people who scold their children who run too far or make too much noise. There are 
families of varied sizes and people standing on their own, trying to keep hold of several plastic 
bottles in one hand.  Looking at the people queued here, it is easy to understand why this space 
is touted as being representative of the ‘rainbow nation’. However, the only noticeable common 
thread is the plastic bottles that people are holding or are placed next to them. The motivation 
for being here on a sunny Saturday morning is clear. After about 40 minutes of standing off to 
the side of the spring, I have watched the line evolve. At one point it was short, consisting of 
just ten people. Shortly after that, it is substantially longer than when I arrived. The informal 
guards who carry water bottles back and forth to the cars are running without pause, hoping to 
cash in on the large crowd. In such a short amount of time, I have witnessed the space transform 
from being loud and busy, to quiet and calm, with only a few people waiting to collect water. 
It is also on this visit that I meet Riyaz Rawoot for the first time.  
 
Riyaz comes up to me and asks which newspaper I write for. I tell him that I am not a journalist, 
but rather a master’s student from Stellenbosch University (SU). We sit down together on a 
patch of grass just off to the side of the water collection point. In my mind, this would be an 
informal discussion about the spring, but Riyaz has had this discussion several times over the 
last few weeks and can now easily reduce a complex situation into a 40-minute presentation. 
So, I sit and listen. Riyaz’s main theme in this discussion is that the city council is unwilling 
to work with the community to come to an agreement regarding how the spring should be run 
and used. For Riyaz, this is personal, as his family had lived in the area prior to being forcefully 
removed during Apartheid. It is clear from our discussion that Riyaz has come to be somewhat 
of a gatekeeper – or as he ironically calls himself, the “water master” – of the Kildare Road 
spring. He cares deeply about this space and it’s important to him to ensure that things run 
smoothly. The complaints that stream in from residents who live in the area are personal for 
him. Not because they are directed at him, but because he understands the residents’ point of 
views and tries to address their concerns and issues. Throughout our discussion, Riyaz is 
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interrupted by people saying hello from their spot in the queue, or by the informal guards letting 
him know what is happening on the road or informing him that they are going to take a break 
for a short while. So much of this space seems to centre around him, and I wonder if this is 
because of his character, or perhaps because of what he has done for this space. Riyaz is 
responsible for the makeshift infrastructure that can be found here. He built the outlet pipe 
which allows multiple people to collect water at the same time – a more efficient infrastructure 
compared to the single pipe that was previously in its place. He also put up the various 
laminated signs reminding people to be considerate of others (“25l for me, 25l for you”), 
including a petition he started to block the City of Cape Town (CoCT) from moving the 
collection point, firmly hanging on the nearby tree. He organizes the informal car guards, puts 
up tape to guide the queues, and thereafter tells me that he usually comes here twice a day – 
morning and evening. These are the rush hours of the spring, and he likes to keep an eye out to 
make sure things do not get out of hand. Part of Riyaz’s presentation concern the complaints 
around the spring. People living in the area have several issues with it. These issues range from 
noise pollution, traffic congestion, safety concerns, and the site being left ‘dirty’. As these 
complaints come up, Riyaz has tried to solve them, but he is often left feeling like the 
complaints are masked ways of saying something entirely different: this area is not open to the 
public.  
 
After our first meeting, Riyaz and I would see each other throughout the remainder of 2018. 
His passion for the spring reveals itself as a proxy for many other experiences and opinions he 
has. If I had to try to label him, I would say he is an active citizen. But my labelling of him is 
not the only perception he has to entertain. On a rainy weekday, we meet up for my first official 
interview with him. Our meeting this time is very different in nature, and there is a noticeable 
change in his demeanour. He is as friendly as ever, but the way he talks about the spring, and 
the events around it, has changed. On the 25th of May 2018, the spring was sealed off by the 
CoCT. On my first visit back at the spring since it had been closed, I felt emotional. The site 
that I had only known as busy and vibrant was now desolate. A large cement block covered the 
water outlet. When Riyaz sounded disillusioned while talking about the spring, I was not 
surprised. If the closure of the spring that I had visited just a few times left me feeling 
disheartened, I could only imagine how someone who put so much time and effort into the 
space felt. We spent a lot of time talking that day, but I found myself skirting around bringing 
up the spring. When I got home and started writing up my notes from the interview, I noticed 
several gaps in my questions and the discussion overall. The gaps were where my questions 
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about the spring, and what had happened, should have been. These questions, however, seemed 
inappropriate. 
 
After that interview with Riyaz, I realized that trying to capture the complexity of the spring, 
as well as the broader issue of the water crisis, was going to be complicated. Roitman and 
Mbembe write that “the physicality of the crisis reduces people to a precarious condition that 
affects the very way in which they define themselves” (1993: 330). The discussion with Riyaz 
would be my first encounter with this ‘precarious condition’ that played out during the water 
crisis. Because of this, I have come to view the water crisis as having two sides. The first is the 
public side, which involves the media, politics, and public engagement from civil society. The 
second is the private side, which exists behind closed doors and on the level of the personal. 
Looking at the water crisis through this lens has allowed for a better understanding of crisis, as 
it too has both public and private sides. The following chapters will discuss the water crisis 
through the lens of discourse, how media has documented this crisis, and how infrastructure – 
the presence and absence of it – plays a central role. The aim is to show that how we understand 
the experience of the drought is multifaceted, and thus needs to be considered not just as an 
event which passed when the winter rain came, but as one tied to historic injustice, 
infrastructure inaccessibility, and a campaign that tried to manage it all. What is important to 
take away from this is that the spring tells a story that neither started nor ended with the 
#DayZero campaign. It started long before and is still being told. For this reason, this project 
does not have a clear ending. Rather, it culminates with a reflection on how events come into 
and then recede from public consciousness, leaving only those who are still living with severely 




Irish Town, now referred to as Newlands Village, was previously home to a diverse group of 
people. In the 1890s, a prominent settlement of Irish immigrants settled in the area around 
Kildare Road. The area was mostly lower working class, with The Ohlsson brewery employing 
many of the Irish settlers. The Irish community moved away in the twentieth century, and 
thereafter the area, known for its single-story cottages and close community, became a mixed-
race area (McCracken, 1992: para 1). Until the 1960s, Irish Town was a middle-class, suburban 
neighbourhood with residents of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The area 
is roughly located between Main Street and Newlands Avenue, and Governors Lane to the 
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Newlands Spring. In the 1960s, Irish Town underwent a transformation both in name and in 
residential composition. As the bulldozers of the Apartheid regime sunk their teeth into the soil 
of Irish Town, they ripped up its name as well as its residents classified as ‘non-white’, 
dumping them elsewhere (Law, 2007: 59). The Kildare Road spring in this area was a space 
where residents came to collect water, engage with neighbours, and catch up on the 
neighbourhood gossip. However, the space of the spring changed with the forced removals, as 
the National Party dictated the area to be reserved for ‘whites’ only. Today, 26 years after the 
first democratic election in South Africa, Newlands Village remains a mostly white, middle to 
upper-class area. The Kildare Road spring offers an interesting insight into the complex past 
and present of the suburb formally known as Irish Town.  
 
This project will look at the Kildare Road spring as a space through which the water crisis 
unfolds, and how crisis can be seen as a chronic condition for some. At the time of 
conceptualizing this project, the spring was open to the public. On the 25th of May 2018, the 
spring was closed by council workers. Prior to its closure, there were numerous debates and 
engagements around various issues, most of which were focused on three questions: who 
should have access to the spring, to whom does the spring belong, and how does the area’s 
history factor into all of this? My project aims to investigate several answers to these questions 
by considering how historical inequality, access to resources, and crisis management by 
government have played out through social and traditional media to tell the story of the 
#DayZero campaign and the Kildare Road spring.  
 
1.3. Timeline of the drought 
 
The Cape Town drought’s starting point is disputed. For some, it began in 2015/2016 when the 
third winter rain season was far below average. For others, it began in 2017 when the CoCT 
began their “critical water shortage plan” (Robins, 2019: 6 & Visser, 2018: 1). Media coverage 
on the decreasing dam levels started in 2015. Level 2 water restrictions were introduced in 
January 2016, despite initial reassurance from the municipal council that there was “no 
concern” over the dam levels (Visser, 2018: 3). At this point, the agriculture sector was 
excluded from these restrictions, as municipalities focused on residential and business water 
consumption. The target at this point was to reduce water usage by 20%. The lack of rain was 
being discussed as a sign of ‘changing times’ – evidence that climate change was a tangible 
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and real threat to our daily lives. By November of the same year, water restrictions were 
escalated to level 3. 
 
Only three months later in February 2017, it was announced that the Cape Town’s largest 
supply dam, Theewaterskloof, was at 34% capacity. It then became the City’s mandate to 
reduce water consumption by 30%, resulting in level 3B water restrictions coming into effect. 
At this level, water behaviour was not merely restricted, it was punished if consumption was 
in excess of the stipulated threshold. ‘Bad’ water users were fined for overconsumption and 
water restriction devices were rolled out for the most severe overconsuming households. 
Gardens could only be watered twice a week with buckets, and a media campaign was launched 
to inform (and strongly encourage) people to think differently about their water usage (Visser, 
2018: 3). At this point, the construction of a desalination plant to support the City’s water needs 
was considered, but ultimately was deemed too expensive and it would have had a large impact 
on water tariffs. One month later in March, the Western Cape was declared a disaster area by 
the provincial government (Visser, 2019, 2-3). This announcement meant that the province 
could implement ‘water demand management’ plans, where previously plans were specifically 
focused on strategy to prevent ‘Day Zero’. The City started to actively reduce the water 
pressure in taps and, after a speech by then Executive Major Patricia De Lille, CoCT officials 
began talking about the ‘new normal’. Level 4 water restrictions were soon introduced, which 
meant that municipal water could only be used for cooking, drinking, and essential washing 
(Visser, 2019: 3). The City started sending out notices about how people ought to consider 
allocating their water, disaggregating consumption along the lines of these categories (Robins, 
2019: 2). The Western Cape collectively held its breath for the coming rainfall season, which 
again proved to be below average. 
 
Now in crisis mode, the City increased water restriction levels to 4B, which entailed a rationing 
of 87 litres of water per day per person. This ration of water was managed through increasing 
tariffs on disobedient water users and suspending the free basic allocation of water (which 
previously was 6 kilolitres of water per month per household), unless you qualified as a 
“registered poor famil[y]” (Visser, 2018: 3). As September approached, dam levels were 
hovering around 27%, and level 5 water restrictions were implemented. The restrictions 
required commercial water usage to decrease by a further 20%, with domestic use being 
restricted to 20 kilolitres per day per household. The mayor warned people about experiencing 
water interruptions and encouraged people to store potable water. This communication fuelled 
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the already panicked public, leading to grocery stores having to ration the amount of water 
each person was permitted to purchase. 
 
The CoCT was under heavy scrutiny due to its failure to address the crisis, as the emergency 
plans which were proposed several months earlier had not been implemented (such as drilling 
into aquifers and building temporary desalination plants). It was also around this time that the 
City announced that 200 water points would be stationed around the city for daily water 
collection for “when the taps run dry”. It was expected that the estimated 3.7 million people 
living in Cape Town would collect 25 litres of water each day (Visser, 2018: 4). This plan fell 
under the category of level 7 water restrictions, which would be implemented as the most 
‘severe’ category of restrictions. Level 7 also included a water cut-off to 75% of the city, only 
leaving taps on for “critical services” such as hospitals, schools, old age homes, and the 
collection points. In the wake of the panic, opportunistic business ventures emerged, with many 
people beginning to sell non-potable water from boreholes or springs. On the 1st of February 
2018, level 6B restrictions were announced. People living in Cape Town and its surrounds were 
restricted to using 50 litres of water per day per person. At this stage, the water crisis had 
become so severe that even the property market felt the pinch. According to Visser, property 
values decreased on average by 5.5% (2018:4). Those who could afford it started drilling 
boreholes to the extent that, between December 2017 and January 2018, an increase from 1 
500 to 23 000 boreholes were registered with the City council (Visser, 2018: 4). This picture 
painted by Visser shows the extent to which the drought affected households in Cape Town 
and the broader Western Cape region.  
 
1.4. Aim of the project 
 
The aim of my project is not to provide an objective answer, or even to seek out one answer to 
these questions. Rather, it seeks to show that spaces have history, and history is contested. 
Early on in my data collection, it became clear that people had different perspectives of the 
history, heritage, and use of the space of the Kildare Road spring. Rather than attempting to 
find a singular pattern or common narrative, I wish to showcase the various stories that people 
have shared. In order to find these varied narratives, I have relied on in-person encounters and 
media documentation of the drought and the #DayZero campaign. But in the process of 
showing how contested the Kildare Road spring was as a space, several more themes became 
apparent. The people I spoke to hardly ever solely spoke about the space. They often tied the 
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space to something broader, such as access to water infrastructure or the cost of water. They 
brought up the Democratic Alliance (DA) and how the CoCT managed the spring and the 
drought. Climate change and the ‘new reality’ of water often came up too. As such, this project 
shifted away from studying the history of the spring and became more about the broader 
reasons and events which drove contemporary people to the spring in the first place. And then 
once people arrived en masse, the issues that arose.  
 
1.5. Research Design 
 
My research design has needed to adapt since the proposal of this project as the research has 
shifted from studying a place to studying a phenomenon. This project was always going to be 
focused on the Kildare Road spring, but as I spent more time there and talked to more people, 
I came to realise how important it was to understand the various happenings around the spring 
rather than only the space itself. People have various motivations for ending up at the Kildare 
Road spring. There is no single factor, but if you pressed me to give the main reason why 
people went there, I would say free access. If I had to provide more detail, I would say the 
drought compounded already existing structural inequalities and failures that made access to 
water expensive. I was frequently asked to summarise this project into a few short sentences, 
and I have not yet been able to do so. Firstly because, in my mind, this does not seem possible. 
Secondly, because this is not a skill of mine. But mostly, it is because it does not seem possible 
to explain what this research is about without needing to explain the context of what was and 
had been happening long before people started queuing for water at the Kildare Road spring. 
It was for this reason that I needed to find a focus that would be able to connect these various 
dimensions of the study. I decided on media because, by definition, it is media’s role to 
document everything, especially now given the prominence of social media. John E. 
Richardson writes: 
 
“[j]ournalistic discourse has some very specific textual characteristics, some very specific 
methods of text production and consumption, and is defined by a particular set of relationships 
between itself and other agencies of symbolic and material power. These three sets of 
characteristics- that is, the language of journalism, its production and consumption and the 
relations of journalism to social ideas and institutions – are clearly inter-related and 




It was through researching the journalistic discourse around the drought, the #DayZero 
campaign, and the Kildare Road spring that I could piece together the varied themes and events 
that are discussed throughout the coming chapters. It is not possible to understand the 
significance of the spring if you do not understand the significance of the Group Areas Act. It 
is not possible to understand why the drought was so severe without understanding how 
infrastructure is planned and built to provide access to specific groups of people. It is not 
possible to explain who or how these decisions are made without looking at who is governing 
and how they go about addressing historical failures and inequalities of previous governments. 
For the purpose of this research, social and traditional media allowed these themes to be 
documented and discussed in an easily accessible way. However, this project did not solely 
rely on media for information. The project started with an informal interview and has depended 
on many more formal and informal interviews and discussions. And of course, there would be 
no research if there was no ‘field’ of research, so participant observation was also a necessity 
to my research design. As such, this project has required both archival work and field work in 
order to construct an ethnography that unpacks the complex stories and events that made up 
the drought. This project is a qualitative study. I did not have a large sample of people that I 
tried to survey or ask specific questions in order to draw inferences about a broader population. 
Instead, I approached the interviews as discussions and allowed them to ebb and flow, only 
occasionally guiding the participants back to the broader theme of the drought. This approach 
was deeply rewarding as people spoke freely about what was on their minds at the time, rather 
than trying to answer my list of questions. This also meant that people often made the 
connections between the spring and government, or the spring and infrastructure, or the spring 
and climate change, on their own, without me trying to suggest that there was a connection. I 
also felt that this approach allowed the participants to guide me as to what was important, rather 
than me trying to steer them to the answers I may have consciously or unconsciously wanted.  
 
This research is thus exploratory in nature and was conducted both in person and online. This 
project depended on rich descriptions and did not have a pre-determined hypothesis, but rather 
allowed the interviews and social media analysis to inform its core themes, as is common in 
ethnography (Hine, 2000: 20-22). This also allowed for people to discuss their experience 
freely, and I could interpret this data not in order to fit or prove a hypothesis, but rather as 
valuable information which informed my key questions. My interviews were randomly 
sampled depending on who was at the spring when I visited. I did not pre-arrange my initial 
interviews or discussions, and only scheduled interviews with Riyaz Rawoot once I had already 
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spoken to him casually at the spring. My interview process and questions were mostly 
“unstructured” according to Bryman’s definition (2012: 213). My goal was to allow people to 
talk about the spring and the water crisis without providing a set of questions, and only guiding 
the conversation with follow-up questions in response to what had already been said. I did not 
introduce any concepts such as climate change, crisis management, CoCT officials, or water 
crisis. However, I found that in most of the conversations a combination of these concepts 
would come up, most frequently being the general water crisis and how the crisis was being 
managed.  
 
1.6. Problem statement & research questions 
Access to infrastructure is not a new topic. In particular, the lack of access to infrastructure and 
resources amongst certain groups in Cape Town is not a new topic (Shepard, 2019). However, 
the drought provided a context for us to view this inequality in a new light. Brain Larkin writes 
that studying infrastructure helps us decode the semiotics and “poetics of infrastructure” (2013: 
3). By this, Larkin means that infrastructure is embedded with meaning, they are designed with 
immense amount of thought and care. For this reason, where infrastructure is built, maintained, 
or absent speaks to more than just their functional uses. It also speaks to how infrastructure is 
used to connect, disconnect, or keep separate different people, objects, and locations (Larkin, 
2013: 330). The drought in Cape Town highlighted how access to working infrastructure during 
a crisis plays a vital role in how the crisis is experienced and managed. So when media and 
public narratives emerged calling the drought the ‘great leveller’ – a concept that has been 
disputed by Robins in his paper ‘Day Zero’, Hydraulic Citizenship and the Defence of the 
Commons in Cape Town: A Case Study of the Politics of Water and its Infrastructures (2019: 
2) – these narratives were challenged. It quickly became evident that the middle and upper 
classes had access to private sources of water such as boreholes and water storage tanks and 
could afford to buy trollies full of five-litre water bottles from grocery stores. But for many 
people living in lower income areas and informal settlements, the drought compounded 
difficulties of accessing already limited resources. Henrik Vigh’s article Crisis and Chronicity: 
Anthropological Perspectives on Continuous Conflict makes the argument that for many 
people, “crisis is endemic rather than episodic and cannot be delineated as an isolated period 
of time, or temporary” (2008: 1). As such, for people who are marginalized due to structural 




This increasing threat to water availability meant that free water sources became vital. People 
quickly began to queue for water from springs all across the Cape peninsula. My research thus 
begins by looking at crisis, the temporary and chronic nature of the experience thereof, and 
how this crisis in particular challenged the media narrative of the ‘great equaliser’ or ‘great 
leveller’. As such, my key research questions are the following: 
o In what ways can the Kildare Road spring serve as a space to understand temporary 
and chronic crisis?   
o How does media (social and traditional) construct narratives around crisis? 
o What role does infrastructure play in challenging the ‘great equaliser’ or ‘great 
leveller’ narratives?  
 
1.7. Chapter outline 
 
Chapter 1 above has covered a brief history of the site which has provided the background for 
my research questions and aims. This was then followed by a discussion on the research design 
and methodology used in this project. Following this outline and prior to beginning Chapter 2, 
I highlight the ethical considerations and personal reflections I needed to consider throughout 
the research and writing of this project. Chapter 2 will provide a brief theoretical framework 
of my project. The framework consists of contributions by leading authors in the fields of 
infrastructure, governance, and media which were crucial in helping frame my own research. 
Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the theme ‘drought as an event of crisis’. This chapter 
will consider how droughts, and the campaigns created to manage them, rely on how crisis is 
constructed in people’s lives in order to evoke fast and decisive behavioural changes. In order 
to do this, the concept of crisis is discussed, followed by a case study of how a severe drought 
in Greece was managed by using similar strategies as the #DayZero campaign. Chapter 4 
focuses on traditional media and discusses the role of news reporting as a narrative creating 
and sharing tool. This chapter considers the pitfalls of media narratives as tools of shared 
experience by discussing how historically, traditional media highlights only certain voices and 
experiences and that the reporting of events is not homogenous. Chapter 5 provides a 
discussion of social media and how it has changed the landscape of crisis communication and 
management. In many ways, the #DayZero campaign was created for social media, and it could 
be argued that it had its biggest impact through social media platforms. However, social media 
also became a tool for people to get involved in crisis management and communication in a 
way that traditional media does not facilitate. In some respects, this made the government’s 
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response to the crisis trickier as factors of trust and representation became the focus of the 
crisis. Chapter 6 will be the conclusion of the project. I will summarise my research and 
findings and provide some reflections on how the water crisis has played out since starting this 
project.  
 
1.8. Ethical considerations 
 
When submitting the proposal for this project for ethical consideration, the project was deemed 
low risk. The tick boxes I filled in were sufficient in convincing the ethics board that no harm 
would come from this project and that I was not researching a vulnerable group. So, in terms 
of the system requirements, there was little ethical concern around my project. However, this 
did not dismiss the concerns I personally had about this project. I worried about how people 
would feel having their stories told in an academic paper that they may well never read or have 
access to. I worried about representation, and how to go about selecting and discarding stories. 
This was the part of my research I found most challenging, as everyone who spoke to me about 
their experience of the spring, and the drought in general, had valid and important stories, but 
I had to decide which to focus on in this project. The next hurdle I faced was using 
conversations that took place on social media in this project. It is easy to take something said 
on social media out of context and use it where it will be most impactful to your work. I tried 
to avoid doing this as far as possible. Then there is the issue of bias. I often found myself 
disagreeing with the perspectives of participants. In the context of talking to someone in person, 
it may be more difficult to school your thoughts (and facial expressions) when someone says 
something you disagree with or know not to be the case. But this also happened while I was 
collecting data from social media, where I came across several instances of blatant racism and 
islamophobia. I have tried my best to remain objective and not let moments of disagreement 




2. Theoretical framework 
 
When researching infrastructure there is a quote that always seems to appear. Brian Larkin 
wrote that “[i]nfrastructures are material forms that allow for the possibility of exchange over 
space. They are the physical networks through which goods, ideas, waste, power, people, and 
finance are trafficked” (2013: 1). In this quote, Larkin summarises perfectly why research into 
infrastructure is so important and insightful – it allows us to understand, through material 
means, the various societal exchanges that occur on small and large scales. And because we 
are able to observe these exchanges, we are able to understand the meanings imbued into them. 
For this project, the exchange is primarily focused on water. However, the more you study 
water, or the lack thereof, the more you realise that infrastructure is a complex network of 
objects, attached to an even more complex network of planning and governance. In this light, 
this chapter will focus on prominent literature that has contributed to the discipline of 
anthropology’s understanding of infrastructure, especially as it pertains to water. The authors 
mentioned in this chapter will provide the main theoretical grounding that has aided my own 
understanding and helped me to formulate my research questions around the 2016 – 2018 
drought in Cape Town. This chapter will also consider how concepts around citizenship, crisis, 
and media come into play when trying to understand how inequality and historical legacies 
impact our approach and response to crisis, and especially how this may vary as a consequence 
of race and class differentiation.  
 
Larkin goes on to describe how the anthropological study of infrastructure requires us to not 
only study actual infrastructure, but also to study the “politicians, technocrats, economists, 
engineers, and road builders, as well as the road users themselves” (2013: 2). Infrastructure, in 
Larkin’s view, is political. It is an “apparatus of governmentality” (Foucault quoted in Larkin, 
2013: 2). As such, the study of infrastructure allows us insight into government planning, 
efficiency, and some would argue, intention. But beyond this, infrastructure is not only 
functional – it is also a product of design, and it engages with questions of cultural meanings 
and aesthetics. Larkin writes “[f]ocusing on the issue of the form, or the poetics of 
infrastructure, allows us to understand how the political can be constituted through different 
means… it also means… understanding what sort of semiotic objects they are, and determining 




This broader approach to infrastructure that goes beyond its functional aspects is important to 
consider here, because the process of collecting water at the Kildare Road spring did not only 
concern water and pipes. The spring cannot be separated from its environment, and the 
environment cannot be separated from the attention the spring received. If this was the case, 
all the springs in Cape Town would have been shut down by the city – yet today there are still 
various sites available where people collect water. There was something about a plastic pipe 
with holes drilled into it, against the backdrop of a winding river, with lush green foliage all 
around that contributed to the experience of the spring, but also to its closure. Perhaps if the 
Kildare Road spring was not in a quiet, suburban road in the middle of Newlands with a 
retirement home next to it, it would still be around. But it is precisely the somewhat serene, 
close-to-nature, away-from-a-busy-main-road characteristic of the spring that made it so 
appealing to many. What is important to consider here is why people were relying on the spring, 
as opposed to more traditional water infrastructure. 
 
Infrastructure navigates an exchange over distance that brings together different people, 
objects, and locations into interaction (Larkin, 2013: 330). For this project, the main interaction 
of interest is between the residents of Cape Town, government officials of various levels, and 
access to water. All these actors are connected through the City’s water infrastructure, from 
dams, pipelines, and desalination plants to springs and water meters. These inanimate objects 
are imbued with meaning, which in design are homogenous but in usage and perception are 
varied and complicated. It is within this varied experience of infrastructure that we are able to 
observe the structural inequalities that have persisted for decades, and how political and social 
inequality manifests through infrastructure. The lens I use to document these experiences is 
media, which in its own right has a network of infrastructure that is subject to the same 
inequalities as water infrastructure. The reason that infrastructure can come to represent these 
inequalities is because it does not exist in isolation. Larkin writes that “an infrastructure is an 
amalgam of technical, administrative, and financial techniques” (2013: 330). As such, it is an 
accumulation of decisions made by people who represent a host of interests all trying to figure 
out the optimal implementation of an infrastructure.  
 
Anita Von Schnitzler (2008) documents how these systems interact in post-apartheid South 
Africa, which is hugely useful for my own research. Her paper Citizenship prepaid: water, 
calculability, and techno-politics in South Africa discusses similar themes that appear in my 
own work; notably, that infrastructure is often used to create a ‘type of citizen’. Because of 
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this, infrastructures cannot solely be viewed as inanimate objects that make our lives easier, 
because they are implemented with a desired outcome in mind. However, when a society is 
deeply unequal, this desired outcome may be unfairly targeted at groups who have less political 
and social autonomy. South Africa is no stranger to service delivery protests. So, in 2004 when 
hundreds of people gathered at Mary Fitzgerald Square in Johannesburg to protest the 
installation of water meters in informal settlements (particularly in Soweto), it was not out of 
the norm (2008: 900). Von Schnitzler writes about how the protestors marched to the Civic 
Centre, some carrying the prepaid meters with them to leave at the Civic Centre as a statement. 
The prepaid meter in itself is a contested object of infrastructure. The roll-out of the meter, first 
for electricity and later for water, was largely focused on townships. Von Schnitzler writes that 
“The scale of the deployment of prepaid meters in South Africa is globally unprecedented: it 
is estimated that of the eight million one-way prepaid meters deployed globally, six million are 
located in South Africa. Simultaneously, South Africa has become a leader in the development 
of prepayment technology, exporting meters and expertise to the rest of the continent and, 
increasingly, to other places in the global South” (2008: 900).  
The prepaid meter, for both water and electricity, is used as a cost recovery device – a concept 
and institution that is embedded in neoliberal ideals of privatisation and accumulation. 
However, as the water meter protest shows, there are complex political and ethical questions 
or considerations that need to be taken into account with these infrastructures. Water, as Von 
Schnitzler writes, is “unlike other basic services, [water] is not substitutable, and is thus 
essential to survival” (2008: 901). Due to this, the conversation around water privatization is 
contested. Neoliberal reforms depend on an economic rationality which usually results in a 
socially and economically marginalised group. Because this neoliberal system depends entirely 
on a free, self-regulating market, it requires citizens who prescribe to the belief that cost-benefit 
analysis is necessary, and the means for this analysis occurs through specific devices or 
measurement. The water meter, then, is “central not only to making water calculable, but more 
fundamentally, to creating a calculative rationality” (Von Schnitzler, 2008: 902). 
During the drought in Cape Town, water technology and infrastructure received significant 
push back and criticism from advocacy groups and residents of lower-income areas. There 
were concerns and accusations that the City was taking advantage of the poor and installing 
water management devices (WMD) to monitor and manage the amount of water that certain 
households used (Oukula, 2018 & Mortlock: 2018). The installation of these devices was 
labelled as “forceful” and “involuntary”. The City argued that the WMD were part of the City’s 
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drought intervention plan and were targeted at ‘water guzzlers’(Oukula, 2018 & Mortlock: 
2018). However, members of the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG) argued that “the 
installation of WMDs in indigent households is merely a debt managing campaign as it has 
been taking place since 2007, before the drought” (Mortlock, 2018). Adding further fuel to the 
fire, residents were responsible for the installation and device bill, which cost R4 000, despite 
being installed without their approval. The fee for the WMD was added to resident’s municipal 
account automatically (Mortlock, 2018). Xanthea Limberg, a DA councillor, responded to 
these complaints on CapeTalk radio by saying “The R4 000 which is added to your account is 
not just the device you are paying for. It's essentially for the contraventions of water 
restrictions” (Oukula, 2018). The back and forth between residents and the City meant that the 
roll-out plan for the WMD were massively delayed and received significant negative reporting 
by media (Oukula, 2018.) This attempt by the City to make water more calculable and attempts 
to try change water-using behaviour by making water more expensive, is not a new approach 
in South Africa. 
Von Schnitzler’s work highlights how a similar strategy was used by the City of Johannesburg.  
In 2002, the City of Johannesburg established Johannesburg Water Pty (Ltd) as an independent 
company with management contracts awarded to Suez Group, a France-based consortium. The 
reason given for this appointment was that the private consortium would create efficiency to 
optimise the water provision system. Almost instantly, the consortium began to focus on 
Soweto. In 2003, they launched the Gcin’amanzi project, which had the goal of curbing 
massive water losses in the township. The project began marketing the idea that up to 70% of 
water was unaccounted for in Soweto due to leakages and illegal water connections (Von 
Schnitzler, 2008: 904). The Gcin’amanzi project would address this loss by replacing old, 
broken down infrastructure and by installing prepaid water meters in all Sowetan households. 
Although in theory the plan was viewed positively, residents who were forced to have water 
meters installed took issue with the plan. The prepaid meters meant that residents were 
subjected to the constant measurement of their usage, a perpetual check on how much water 
they were consuming (Von Schnitzler, 2008: 904). 
Although such awareness is not necessarily a bad thing, the residents protested against the fact 
that these prepaid meters were being installed in townships only. This meant that wealthy and 
middle-class, predominantly ‘white’ areas were not being targeted for their consumption and 
therefore did not need to account for the water they used (Von Schnitzler, 2008: 904). The 
protestors also called into question who was using more water, those who lived in the township, 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 16 
or those who lived in these suburbs. Von Schnitzler writes “They also pointed out that prepaid 
meters were only being installed in the townships, rather than in the wealthy, predominantly 
white, northern suburbs where water usage per person was higher, given amenities such as 
pools and the irrigation of large gardens” (2008: 904). This argument also came up frequently 
during the Cape Town drought. Research done by GroundUp found that at least 64% of WMD 
were installed in low-income households, not in more affluent homes where, according to 
GroundUp, “water restrictions [were] being flouted” (Roeland, 2018:1). However, data 
collected from various organizations on water consumption across the CoCT shows that 
consumption tends to be significantly higher in wealthier suburbs relative to low-income areas. 
Even though the WMD were introduced as a voluntary program, many residents complained 
that they had not given consent to have the devices installed, however they were installed 
regardless (Roeland, 2018 & Bratton, 2017). Thabo Lusuthi of EMG argued that the City had 
not been transparent in their plans and did not properly consult residents (Roeland, 2018). 
These accusations were often coupled with the argument that the City was profiting from the 
devices and the actual objective of the devices was cost recovery as the City had observed a 
steep decrease in revenue due to the drought (Roeland, 2018). 
Partha Chatterjee’s work on governance in India is crucial for my own work in this project. 
Chatterjee unpacks the postcolonial reality of government, as shaped by and determined 
through the colonial legacy. In his lecture titled “The Nation In Heterogeneous Time”, 
Chatterjee (2001) disaggregates citizenship into two categories: the formal and ‘the real’. This 
decomposition of citizenship is interesting to consider for my own work as this project argues 
that ‘crisis’ is not always a single or temporary experience. Rather, crisis can be chronic and 
experienced in everyday life by some. Again, this theory supports the idea of the ‘great 
equaliser’ being problematic, not only because people have varied means to cope or adjust to 
crisis, but because they are also governed and respond to government differently. Chatterjee 
puts forward the notion that politics, similar to lived experience, can be split into two. To 
elaborate, he discusses Benedict Anderson’s (1983) concept of homogenous time (discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4) and argues rather that time is heterogenous and “unevenly dense” 
(Chatterjee, 2001: 7). By this, Chatterjee expresses that people of a nation do not experience 
universalities. The factory worker or peasant farmer does not experience time the same as the 
neurosurgeon or attorney. Although he uses the caste system in India to explain this, the same 
can be said for any nation that experiences notable wealth inequalities. Chatterjee writes that it 
would be problematic to uphold “the universalist ideals of nationalism without simultaneously 
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demanding that the politics spawned by governmentality be recognized as an equally legitimate 
part of the real time-space of the modern political life of the nation. Without it, governmental 
technologies will continue to proliferate and serve, much as they did in the colonial era, as 
manipulable instruments of class rule in a global capitalist order” (2001: 25). The breaking 
down of the concept of universalities became evident during the Cape Town drought precisely 
because for some it started in 2016, whereas for others it had been a persistent reality for years, 
if not decades. Whether due to limited access, as is the case for many who live in informal 
settlements, or due to cost barriers for those who live in low-income areas, water restrictions 
and scarcity have long been the daily reality of many Cape Town residents. The narrative of 
the drought being a ‘great equaliser’ and to deploy a campaign that focuses on changing the 
behaviour of consumption on the premise that everyone uses and has access to water equally 
was a fundamental flaw in the DA’s drought response.  
 
Chatterjee (2004) provides a theoretical account of this in his book The Politics of the 
Governed. In theory, all civil society is afforded equal rights as protected by the constitution 
and laws of that nation. As such, the state interacts with civil society as equal individuals. 
However, in reality, being a rights-bearing citizen is often ambiguous and tenuous. There exists 
a political relationship that allows certain population groups to still be provided for or to be 
measured and managed by the state, but that does not always conform to the full expression of 
citizen rights as provided in the constitution. It is often those who have previously been 
politically excluded that experience an ambiguous or limited relationship with the state. 
Although the state may attempt to prioritize or include these voices, it is often in political 
structures that these voices are marginalized (Chatterjee, 2004: 39-40). There is also the matter 
of people who need to live illegally in a nation, despite being a citizen of that nation. This is 
one of the more complex relationships in ‘political society’. Often, people have no choice other 
than to live illegally on land, to illegally secure electricity or water, or to rely on business 
practices that may not meet the legal requirements of the state. These groups are known to 
authorities, but often are not treated or managed the same as other civic groups because their 
livelihoods depend on these illegalities. Chatterjee writes “Yet state agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations cannot ignore them either, since they are among thousands of 
similar associations representing groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation 
involve violation of the law. These agencies therefore deal with these associations not as bodies 
of citizens but as convenient instruments for the administration of welfare to marginal and 
underprivileged population groups” (2004: 40). This relationship between civic groups and the 
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state highlights the gap between constitutionally protected rights and constitutional practices. 
Often amongst groups which dwell illegally, many are willing to acknowledge that they are 
breaking the law and are not demonstrating ‘good civic behaviour’, but argue that their having 
a home and a livelihood is a constitutional right. As such, somewhat of a power struggle exists 
because the state needs to prevent further manipulation of this loophole and try discouraging 
this behaviour whilst navigating the fact that welfare programs cannot provide what is 
necessary according to the constitution. The people who live illegally are aware that they are 
at risk of prosecution and are afforded less political and social mobility due to their 
circumstances. As such, groups within these relationships are classified as those who live in 
political society, according to Chatterjee (2004: 40-41). For residents of informal settlements, 
this classification is all too real. There is a constant need to navigate the line between ‘illegal 
resident’ and ‘constitutionally recognized citizen’. Poor service delivery in townships or 
informal settlements is often blamed on the fact that residents of those areas live ‘illegally’. 
According to the DA, the nature of these areas makes it difficult to provide services to residents 
due to geographical and budget restraints. This has been a persistent battle for residents of 
informal settlements. In 2010/2011, the ‘poo protests’ or ‘toilet wars’ gained momentum and 
attention as fed up residents of townships in Cape Town began protesting the sanitation 
conditions in their areas. This resulted in faecal matter being thrown on a national highway. 
This would eventually lead to a court case where the DA would be accused, and found guilty, 
of violating the constitutional rights of residents in Khayelitsha (Robins 2014 & Redfield & 
Robins, 2016). The question of service delivery is related to the water crisis is a fundamental 
way, because the lack thereof has caused a state of chronic crisis for a large number of residents 
in Cape Town.  
 
Joseph Masco writes that “The power of crisis to shock and thus mobilize is diminishing 
because of narrative saturation, overuse, and a lack of well-articulated positive futurities to 
balance stories of end-times” (2017: 65). When addressing chronic crisis and the relevance of 
this to ‘Day Zero’, we can perhaps better understand why the endemic conditions of limited 
access becomes less significant in media reporting. Crisis is often framed as an existential 
danger, but what if crisis no longer exclusively functions this way? What if crisis is considered 
through the experience of those who “lack political agency”? (Masco, 2017: 65-66). If we 
prioritise this account of crisis, we can then begin to identify the role of media coverage – or 




Because crisis can have such drastic and often devastating effects on entire populations, their 
role in our political, social and economic institutions cannot be understated. Crisis, like 
accidents, are events that no one is immune to and as such, can create more change in a very 
short time period relative to other single phenomenon. However, it also cannot be neglected 
that crisis can be an experience which persists and is not necessarily a temporary event. It is 
for this reason that the communication during and regarding crisis is becoming more and more 
important in research fields. Timothy L. Sellnow and Matthew W. Seeger’s textbook 
“Theorizing Crisis Communication” is dedicated to understanding this. In their introduction, 
they use examples of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina and discuss the immediate and long-term 
effects of these disasters on a federal, state, and civilian level in the United States (US). At the 
time of writing, governments and people across the globe are dealing with the COVID-19 
pandemic and the major disruption that it has caused. Seeger and Sellnow write that “Crises, 
big and small, natural and human caused, are inevitable; in fact, many scholars suggest that 
they are occurring with greater frequency and causing more harm than they have in the past” 
(2013: 2). However, crisis is a broad term and it is important to distinguish what type of crisis 
has occurred. An event such as a hurricane is clearly not the same as a drought. The financial 
crisis of 2008 is not the same as a natural disaster. As such, the response to crisis both in 
management and for people on the ground will also vary. This then often ties into debates 
around responsibility, accountability, and liability. This is important because classifying an 
event as a crisis means that a call to action and a response is needed, along with resources that 
need to be made available (Seeger & Sellnow, 2013: 10). Crisis, as a shock and as a temporary 
event, has been covered by scholars extensively, especially in light of the traditional or classic 
portrayal of communication as static, with an emphasis on the sender having passive receivers. 
But the way we communicate has changed. And our understanding of crisis as a slow form of 
violence or an endemic experience is becoming more apparent. However, how does this factor 
into crisis communication?  
 
Access to communication tools is vast and more people now have access to these tools relative 
to the past. The best-known formula for communication was Berlo’s approach from the 1960s 
in which the formula for communication was generally understood to be the “sender–message–
channel–receiver model” (Seeger & Sellnow, 2013: 10). This model projected communication 
as straightforward and linear, especially in crisis or emergency situations. An example of this 
model is a warning system, such as emergency broadcasting and community-based weather 
sirens. These systems could be active and alert a large number of people of an emergency or 
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crisis, but the receiver could not directly respond or identify an individual behind the 
communication. But communication in crisis does not solely work this way anymore. Although 
these examples still exist, people now have a variety of tools through which they can both 
receive emergency alerts and respond directly or indirectly to these alerts. This means that 
communication is more dynamic, on-going, and transactive – participants are simultaneously 
receivers and senders (Seeger & Sellnow, 2013: 11). This system is also challenged by how 
chronic crisis is reported. The wide availability of social media now enables people to 
document their everyday life. As such, social media has become a tool for people to document 
their daily experience of crisis. Seeger and Sellnow write that digital communication 
technology, including social media and handheld devices, has significantly altered the ecology 
of crisis communication. Some researchers argue that these technologies have repositioned 
those who are at the centre of a crisis as active sources and senders of information, as opposed 
to being passive receivers (2013: 12).  
 
In the case of the #DayZero campaign, residents of the city could immediately voice their 
opinions and experiences of the drought in either a supportive or opposing manner. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the City had to contend with the reality that a large number of residents 
did neither trust the organisation nor the communication coming from the official channels. 
Social media was used by the DA for crisis communication and management reasons, which 
allowed them to engage with their stakeholders in real time. But the DA experienced significant 
disputes against the information being provided through their social media channels. Seeger 
and Sellnow write that lack of trust in institutions or organisations means that information is 
more likely to be disregarded or ignored (2013: 252). For the DA, the information was 
disregarded, ignored, and contested by some. This posed a challenge for how they could 
maximise the effect their social media campaign had on water consumption. Another issue that 
the City experienced was due to what Seeger and Sellnow refer to as “citizen journalism” 
(2013: 128). A good example of how citizen journalism is utilised during a crisis is the recent 
tragedy in Lebanon when an explosion at a factory was recorded on several cell phone devices, 
bringing almost instant global attention to the crisis while it was still unfolding. This not only 
means that government or official organisations will struggle to manage crisis communication, 
but also that traditional media is often late to the party.  
 
The prevalence of social media and the ability to document ‘everyday life’ means that often 
social media becomes the story. If social media becomes the story, people who document 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 21 
their daily realities can use social media to testify to the chronic conditions of crisis which 
they experience. 
3. Drought as an event of crisis 
 
In her book Anti-Crisis, Janet Roitman posits crisis as “a point of view” (2014: 13). This 
chapter will unpack this statement in relation to Cape Town’s water crisis, in order to show 
that the crisis cannot be understood through single narratives. The water crisis is more than rain 
levels, dam percentages, political blame games, news coverage, 50-litre bottles, and behaviour 
restrictions. Water shortages influence various modes of being. As such, its complex network 
requires untangling and understanding. Roitman writes that “[c]risis is a historical event as 
much as it is an enduring condition of life” (2014: 2). This statement was integral to 
understanding my field site, not as a space that closed on the 25th of May 2018 when the 
municipal workers paved over the spring, but rather in a more open-ended sense. I had to come 
to terms with the idea that the water crisis did not begin with the lack of rainfall; it began with 
infrastructure – or rather the lack thereof. This chapter will thus unpack the concept of crisis 
both philosophically, but also practically, as a discussion of activism and infrastructure will be 
included.  
 
How does crisis allow and enable certain narratives and questions whilst restricting others? 
Roitman asks this early on in her book as she attempts to argue that crisis has to be understood 
as more than a period of time when something is wrong. Rather, she argues that crisis is both 
a period of time, as well as an experience of a condition. Roitman’s book Anti-crisis takes an 
in-depth look at the 2008 financial crisis in the US. She used crisis as a narrative device and 
unpacks how various authors have studied and contextualized crisis. Roitman’s argument is 
that defining something as a crisis causes a reaction that allows for certain behaviour to be 
encouraged or discouraged. But most importantly for this project, Roitman points out that crisis 
can neither be only used in events of emergency nor in a temporary manner; rather, crisis also 
needs to be considered as a “condition of life” (2014: 2). This argument is important for my 
own work. The water crisis in Cape Town received a lot of attention; however, the attention 
created was hyper-focused around a largely middle-class experience of the crisis. For the most 
part, informal settlements and poor communities around Cape Town were excluded from the 
crisis narratives that surrounded the drought and #DayZero campaign. Many of these 
communities could be said to have been experiencing enduring water shortages prior to the 
drought, where people use communal water sources to collect a specific amount per day. As 
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such, it could be taken for granted that people living in communities such as Khayelitsha, 
Kayamandi, and other informal settlements in the Western Cape were already well accustomed 
to using less than 50 litres per person per day. Relatively affluent areas such as Sea Point, 
Constantia, and Hout Bay were not accustomed to this new way of living, involving less 
flushing of toilets, shorter showers, and no more automatic sprinklers in the garden. This ‘new 
normal’ was widely documented and discussed not only by the people living in these areas, but 
also by news outlets. In this light, Roitman posits crisis as the breakdown of the ‘normal’: crisis 
“qualifies the very nature of events” (2014: 3). The areas that were experiencing this state of 
shortage for the first time, or were forced by government officials to adapt their behaviour, 
seemed to dominate the narrative because of the ‘newness’ of their complaints or objections. 
Roitman highlights this in her own work by writing that “crisis comes to signify the marking 
out of a ‘new time’ insofar as it denotes a unique, immanent transition phase, or a specific 
historical epoch” (2014: 19). This would support the idea that people who live in middle to 
upper-class areas were experiencing a ‘new time’ or ‘transition phase’. This resulted in the 
prioritisation of their voices against the voices of people who had lived this way long before 
the drought and will continue to live in those conditions long thereafter. However, this is not 
the only way crisis is experienced. Rather, there is merit to argue that droughts are not only 
experienced due to a lack of rain. Droughts can also be caused by lack of access. It is this lack 
of access that may create, what Vigh coins, ‘chronic crisis’ (2008: 2).  
 
Crisis signifies change, but crisis is also a means to locate, recognize, and comprehend history. 
This perspective ties in with the idea that crisis is posited as a judgement of time and a 
judgement of significance (Roitman, 2014: 7). Roitman further writes that crisis is defined as 
“the negative occupation of an imminent world: what went wrong” (2014: 8). The process of 
ascribing significance and judging the extent of crisis requires a negative or a break from what 
is considered the usual. A severe drought certainly qualifies under these criteria, as both 
behaviour and mentality around water access and usage had to change drastically for most 
people living in the Western Cape province. However, this is not what primarily interests me. 
What captured my interest was the inequality that is revealed in times of crisis.  How were 
people from different socio-economic groups experiencing the water shortage? In most of the 
historical literature I have read on crisis, the main conceptualization is that crisis affects 
everyone. Often crisis is discussed as something that is experienced uniformly at a specific 
moment in time. It is seen as an event rather than an ongoing and enduring form of ‘chronic 
crisis’, such as the ‘slow violence’ that Rob Nixon (2011) writes about. For the most part, this 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 23 
was also the case for Cape Town. If ‘Day Zero’ was coming, it was coming for everyone and 
it was a specific event relating to drought. This portrayal of the drought needs to be 
problematised as it attempts to posit the experience of the drought as equally severe for 
everyone. The nuance of the experience is not captured in the public narrative of the drought – 
mostly documented through media accounts of the crisis. It does not look at how increased 
water tariffs would completely undermine the financial security of some households, whilst 
mildly affecting others. It neglects to include the narratives of those who have been living in a 
state of severely restricted access to water for decades. Crisis, in this instance, is not singular 
– it is enduring and chronic for many, especially the poor. I would argue that drought caused 
states of crisis. There were several forms of crisis that came from the drought. Some went away 
with the arrival of the rainy season. Some are yet to go away.  
 
In times of crisis, there are always ‘first responders.’ Who these first responders are however 
differs depending on the type of crisis. Some scholars argue that due to social media’s role in 
increasing the visibility of citizens, citizens are now the “true first responders” in a crisis 
(Ferguson, Boersma & Schmidt, 2018). This is especially true when a crisis occurs after a 
massive accident (such as a plane crash or large explosion) or a natural disaster (such as a 
hurricane or wildfire). In these scenarios, citizens may not be the rescuers, but they are often 
the group which sounds the alarm. This is often because they will capture an image or video of 
the event and post it on social media, alerting a potentially large network of people. This is a 
relatively new development in the dissemination and framing of representations of crisis, as 
well as its management. Before the prominence of social media, crisis representation and 
management largely fell on government agencies and emergency services. There was a top-
down approach to crisis management with officials usually alerting the public of the crisis. But 
when you have people reporting on an event in real time, before such services can be organized, 
this top-down approach shifts to a bottom-up approach. Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and 
Hollingshead write, however, that such networks have “unclear and fluid boundaries; fleeting 
and unclear membership; unclear, fluid, and dispersed leadership; highly unstable task 
definitions and assignments as environmental conditions continuously change; and geographic 
dispersion that makes communication difficult” (2017: 2). But these understandings of crisis 
are often supported by examples of crisis that occur unexpectedly. In the case of a more slowly 
unfolding crisis, it becomes harder to identify who the first responders are and who is meant to 
sound the alarm. How do we think about crisis when it is slowly unfolding, and the impact it 




The following account of the politics of water in Athens, Greece, has considerable significance 
for understanding what happened in Cape Town during ‘Day Zero’. Athens has struggled with 
water scarcity for centuries, according to Maria Kaika (2006). However, in 1985, the city’s 
main reservoir – the Moronos Reservoir – was overflowing. This marked the first time since 
1834 that the city had more water than what was “needed” (Kaika, 2006: 157). The water 
prosperity would however not last, as Athens would experience one of the worst droughts in 
its history between 1989 and 1991. The surplus of water came at a period where legal and 
institutional changes were being made to water resources management, which gave the then 
socialist government a strong platform to centralize decision-making and planning. The new 
nationalised laws and management of water centred around the narrative that water was a 
‘natural gift’, and every citizen had an ‘undeniable right’ to access potable water. The focus of 
water rights was placed on domestic use, over the rights linked to land or property. These 
policies also meant that the state was given the right to expropriate land if it was deemed 
necessary to access water sources. This also came with the right of the state to restrict and 
determine how water could be used (Kaika, 2006: 158). This new philosophy was “to move 
away from mechanical and technocratic approach to planning, and to introduce a socially 
sensitive approach to planning and resource management” (Kaika, 2006: 158).  
 
These plans, however, were based on what the water situation looked like at the time, and not 
how it had looked for most of the time. As such, when the drought period began in 1989, the 
previous enthusiasm about the plan and access to water changed dramatically (Kaika, 2006: 
158-159). Water, which had previously been a force for social cohesion and was spoken about 
as an abundant resource, soon turned into a source of great anxiety for the public and state. 
Soon enough the drought in Athens became a key focus point for media. The drought was used 
to criticize the government for their ‘corrupt’ management of water and water behaviour. 
Similarly, in Cape Town, the drought provided a platform for residents, political parties, and 
non-governmental organizations to criticize how the DA and the CoCT were managing the 
crisis. In Athens, the centralised water management company launched a public awareness 
campaign which included daily announcements and a countdown of 170 days of water. The 
campaign had a slogan: “save the city of thirst”, which reminded people frequently that without 
water, life as people knew it would cease. The narrative from the state focused on 
communicating that nature was causing an ‘indisputable’ crisis, and as such, there was no time 
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to debate about what to do. Urgent and immediate action was the only way to overcome the 
crisis (Kaika, 2006: 159).  
 
At this point, the Greek government introduced emergency measures which, despite wide 
scrutiny from academics and related NGOs, were signed into law under the belief that these 
measures were the only way to overcome the crisis. Much like Cape Town during ‘Day Zero’, 
the emergency measures firstly focused on ‘demand-management strategies’ which included 
increased prices and tariffs as well as the prohibition of certain activities such as car washing 
and garden irrigation. The campaign, especially considering its aforementioned slogan “save 
the city of thirst”, had a strong emotive reaction from residents and the media. Each day the 
countdown was updated, constantly reminding people that the city would soon be ‘thirsty’ and 
life as they knew it would end. As the countdown continued, media organisations became 
increasingly suspicious and critical of the government, and there was considerable pushback 
on the government’s “controlling” nature (Kaika, 2006: 159). This similarly happened in Cape 
Town as the CoCT relied heavily on the behavioural changes that were hoped to emanate from 
the marketing around the drought. The #DayZero campaign focused on changing the behaviour 
of residents. There were daily updates and reminders that the taps would run dry in a specific 
amount of days if drastic changes were not made. Some residents felt they were being unfairly 
targeted by the City. However, both the Athens and Cape Town water saving campaigns 
neglected to address the precarious water conditions which existed prior to the drought. As 
Kaika mentions, Athens was considered as a water scarce region for centuries. It was not 
abnormal for residents to be aware of the water limitations of the city, as they had been 
prevalent for most of their lives (2006: 160). Rather, the distrust of the government’s 
management and campaign to save water stemmed from the sudden implementation of higher 
tariffs which were supposedly solely driven up by the drought. Many argued that these 
increases were not fair, considering that the Greek government relied on an abnormal rainy 
season and developed a water plan based on those figures, as opposed to historical data.  
 
Kaika argues that two of the emergency measures in Athens – the price increases and the 
building of a new dam – served as a neoliberal socio-environmental agenda that was assisted 
by the ‘crisis.’ The increase in water prices was seen as a strategy that disproportionately 
affected people who were low to middle-income earners relative to high income earners. When 
the tariffs took effect on the 1st of March 1990, the price of a cubic meter of water for domestic 
use was increased by 105% to 338%. In other words, this resulted in people paying an average 
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of €2.59 to €6.41 for 15 600 litres of water per month. The state further incentivized water 
saving by imposing a tariff rebate which gave people a reduced bill of €5.08 if they saved 20% 
of their monthly water consumption. However, due to a complex tariff system, this resulted in 
a relatively regressive system. People who were using higher volumes of water – typically 
those in relatively affluent areas – were being offered a greater price reduction. People who 
were consuming more than the 15 600 litres per month but were reducing their use relative to 
what they usually used, saved more money than those who restricted their use according to 
state guidelines. The employees of the public water company (EYΔAΠ) critiqued the pricing 
system as being “inefficient, socially unjust, profiteering and perplexing” (Kaika, 2006: 161). 
The argument that the water crisis was used to drive up the price of water, which unfairly 
targeted the lower class and poor, also occurred during the Cape Town drought. Many felt that 
the DA were not trying to protect the poor, who had long been living with limited access to 
water and sanitation prior to the onset of the drought.  
 
Vigh’s concept of ‘chronic crisis’ outlines a new way of thinking of crisis as context, rather 
than thinking of crisis as an event. There are people who live in enduring conditions of crisis 
that may not be visible to a middle-class public. These conditions challenge the framing of 
crisis as a temporary event or change, which also challenges the framing that crisis is 
experienced equally by all. Rather, ‘chronic crisis’ focuses on the observation that there are 
people who face certain realities that constitute a crisis only when they occur on a wider scale. 
In cases of droughts, the idea of ‘chronic crisis’ draws attention to groups of people who are 
not suddenly affected by limited access to water, but rather have experienced endemic 
inaccessibility to water. To take this further, this means that when policies are put into place to 
manage the crisis, the communities that have already been struggling with restricted access 
tend to be disproportionately affected by these policies. In relation to the drought in Cape 
Town, this meant that people who lived in lower-income areas and informal settlements had to 
change their water consumption behaviour in line with the CoCT’s policies, despite the chronic 
nature of drought in their communities. Moreover, Vigh’s idea of crisis as context also allows 
for a discussion on what contributes to crisis. If we accept that drought for some can be 
regarded as chronic, then this allows for investigation into the factors behind chronic crisis. For 
many communities in Cape Town, this often comes down to access to infrastructure.  
 
Roitman asks that if ‘crisis’ is used to identify what went wrong, what word do we use to 
identify “this has been wrong all along” (2014: 28)? This raises the question of how to approach 
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the crisis within the crisis, the crisis that remains after the rain season arrives again. What is 
left of the ‘great leveller’ or the ‘great equaliser’ when the middle class can go back to ‘normal’, 
but nothing has been done to address the structural inequalities that compounded the water 
crisis for many? This is Nixon’s argument with slow violence when he writes of “[v]iolence 
that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across 
time and space, an attractional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (2011: 
2). The responsibility of the crisis falls to the community and their ability to mobilize and get 
attention from media and government. The community becomes tasked with the job of trying 
to secure access for the area. In order to do this, an attention-grabbing stunt is often required 
to ensure publicity. This again is in contrast to how crisis is usually theorised. Media coverage 
is generally considered a given when there are events of crisis. Yet there is no constant media 
coverage of slow violence, of chronic crisis. Nixon writes “Our media bias toward spectacular 
violence exacerbates the vulnerability of ecosystems treated as disposable by turbo-capitalism 
while simultaneously exacerbating the vulnerability of those whom Kevin Bale, in another 
context, has called “disposable people”” (2011: 4). It is this bias and rendering of certain 
communities as invisible or ‘disposable’ that feeds the chronic nature of crisis and the enduring 
conditions of inequality.  
 
The reality of the water crisis in Cape Town is that, as Roitman says, it is as much a historical 
event as it is an “enduring condition of life” (2014: 2). For many people, the water shortage 
was a short-term reality. However, that is not to say that long-term behavioural change had not 
occurred. But for the most part, middle class people in historically white suburbs are not living 
with severe restrictions anymore; life continues with little to no focus on a water shortage. Yet 
for a substantial group of people living in the townships and informal settlements, the crisis 
has endured. It is for this reason that we have to analyse the water crisis not just in terms of 
availability of water, but also through the lens of infrastructure and access, media and 
governance, and historical events to fully understand why the crisis endures for so many, while 







4. Reflecting on the limits and blind spots of ‘traditional’ media 
representations of ‘Day Zero’ 
 
Traditional media have changed the way we talk about crisis. Traditional media as discussed 
in this chapter refers to news media through largely the mediums of news articles and 
broadcasts such as newspapers, radio broadcasts, and television broadcasts. Traditional media 
has a vast established network that allows information to be spread quickly. These media 
formats also rely on rebroadcasting and repetition in order to spread information and 
awareness. Traditional news cycles can last several days or weeks with the focus on introducing 
new information or conducting analyses from different perspectives. When crisis occurs, media 
acts as both an informant and watch dog. It is for these reasons that one ought to consider the 
important role that traditional media plays when researching crisis, as the documentation and 
the narratives around crisis are often the responsibility of the media. However, media narratives 
are not always entirely accurate or representative. As Carolyn E. Holmes argues, media – 
specifically print media – can and do serve different communities. In South Africa, not only 
does news coverage vary by language, but media consumption also varies by language, race, 
class, and location. Often the facts will be the same but the narrative, the story told by the 
media, is different. In relation to the 2016 – 2018 Cape Town drought and #DayZero campaign, 
this can be seen not only in the narratives about the drought, but also in terms of whose stories 
and experiences were covered. The narrative of the ‘great equaliser’ or the ‘great leveller’ was 
heavily promoted by media agencies, yet if one considers the reality of the drought, it is evident 
that, for some, the drought was not a temporary event, but a reality of chronic crisis which 
plays throughout their everyday lives.  
 
Benedict Anderson wrote that the nation is “an imagined political community – and imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign” (2006: 6). Anderson states that even in small nations, 
there are people who will never meet or engage with one another, yet they will have an idea of 
a communion or belonging. Anderson’s work, Imagined Communities, investigates print 
capitalism and how print media has been used in building nationalism. As such, Anderson’s 
work provides background on how we can see communities not measured by how false or 
genuine they are, but rather in the way they are imagined. Communities are thus, according to 
Anderson, created or imagined and do not exist organically. For this reason, nations are 
inherently limited because they have finite boundaries. They border with other nations. It is 
also not believable that there can only be one nation, encompassing the globe, so they are 
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confined by physical and metaphorical boundaries. Anderson’s work is relevant to this project 
as it shows how print media is used to create often singular narratives with the purpose of 
having a shared ideology or experience, even if one may not be directly affected by the news. 
This idea of shared experience is what underpins the narrative that media reported during the 
drought in Cape Town and throughout the #DayZero campaign. The ‘great equaliser’ was 
meant to symbolize that after long last, South Africans would be equal, all would experience 
the same fate when the taps ran dry. This narrative, however, is problematic in two ways. 
Firstly, the drought did not have the same effect on all households in Cape Town, let alone 
South Africa. Secondly, the media narrative was not representative of those who persistently 
live with water shortages or restrictions, regardless of how full the dams are.  
 
Anderson argues that as people struggle to find meaning in the absence of religion, nations 
become the substitute. Nations provide a collective to belong to, and a collective to fight for. 
But this is not to say that nationalism is the opposite of religious states. Rather, Anderson 
argues that religion was a large cultural system against which the nation came into being. As 
such, there are similarities between how religious belonging and nationalism spread. Both of 
these concepts relied on written language. Where previously only a select few were able to read 
and write religious texts, after 1500 the prevalence of Latin decreased as more texts were 
written in vernacular and became more accessible to the “public” (Anderson, 2006: 15 – 19).  
This meant that a wider audience had access to reading material and, as access to education 
increased, more people were able to write as well. However, what is also key here is what 
reading material became more accessible. Anderson writes that the Gutenberg Bible had been 
printed between 150 million and 200 million times between 1500 and 1600 (2016: 33). At the 
time of writing, it is estimated that the Holy Bible has been printed over five billion times 
(Guinness World Record, 2020). This makes it the most printed book in history. However, the 
Holy Bible has not been the vehicle for nationalism. Although religious texts hold value for 
the imaging of the nation, Anderson argues that it is newspapers, not the Bible, that spread 
nationalism. Anderson writes:  
 
The birth of the imagined community of the nation can be best seen if we consider the 
basic structure of two forms of imaging which first flowered in Europe in the eighteenth 
century: the novel and the newspaper. For these forms provided the technical means for 




Anderson puts forward the idea that newspapers and novels create a representation of the nation 
that many people read at a given time which is how a community is then fashioned. In order to 
understand the imagined community, there needs to be something that ties people together, 
something that is the vehicle for the union of a country. For Anderson, newspapers fulfil this 
role. Newspapers allow people, who will never meet or necessarily be aware of one another, to 
experience the same thing. Newspapers bring awareness to one another and the actions of 
others. However, this linkage is imagined. There is no physical connection or shared moment 
between people. Rather, they are moving through what he calls ‘homogenous, empty time’ at 
the same time (and as such, the date and time of newspaper editions are crucial to the imagined 
community) as they read about the same events. He writes that “each book has its own eremitic 
self-sufficiency” and that “the newspaper is merely an ‘extreme form’ of the book, a book sold 
on a colossal scale” (2006: 34). He goes further to say that reading a newspaper is a solo event, 
yet we are aware that there are thousands of people who will read the same or similar texts 
throughout that day. It is possible for the reader to be sure that this experience is happening but 
have no idea of the identities of these people. As such, they are imagined. It is through this 
experience that the nation is created.  
 
Applying Anderson’s theory of print media in times of crisis allows for a clearer understanding 
of why certain media narratives become so prominent while others only have a small or 
temporary impact. How we consume media has changed dramatically. There is no longer a 
handful of newspapers that come out once a day. Rather, media has evolved into a multi-forum 
medium that provides a constant supply of information. Although newspapers are still printed, 
people today also get news via social media on their personal devices (i.e. ‘smart phones’), as 
well as through radio broadcasts and television programs. Social media has fundamentally 
changed the way we consume and engage with news, which will be discussed in chapter six. 
News from traditional media is still accompanied by a date, but now also includes the time 
down to the second. This is because news develops and changes so rapidly that a 24-hour 
calendar is insufficient. In fact, news has become so constant that there are dedicated television 
channels that screen news the entire day. The question here is, how does this affect our 
understanding of the nation? Of imagined belonging? It is harder to imagine that there is one 
shared experience when news comes from so many different media. With the rise of ‘fake 
news’ and partisan politics, news has become increasingly varied. People often rely on various 
news sources in order to get accurate information, and the news organizations which people 
are loyal to can act as a significant determinant of voting behaviour. In South Africa, this can 
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be even more complex as news, or at least the consumption of news, may differ according to 
race, class, and language. Carolyn E. Holmes (2015) makes a strong case for this by referring 
to how newspapers printed in English, Afrikaans, and isiZulu covered the Marikana massacre 
in 2012. Holmes writes that in the coverage of this tragic event, the facts were often the same, 
but the narrative was different. She writes, “On the whole, these facts are largely undisputed, 
yet at the time of initial coverage of these events, vastly different narratives emerged from 
different language presses” (2015: 272).  
 
The study done by Holmes looks at six different South African newspapers that are popular in 
distinct ‘ethno-linguistic communities’. The article shows that in South Africa there are distinct 
multilingual states which media operates within, and thus there is a creation of both national 
and sub-national imagined communities (Holmes, 2015: 272). The article further argues that 
the differences in coverage create varied understandings of events across communities which 
interrupt the ‘nation’. Holmes writes that “differences in coverage among these papers create 
disparities in understanding across communities and interrupt the process of national identity 
formation through the iterative historical process of news coverage” (2015: 272). In events of 
severe disruptions to everyday life (such as crisis), the narrative that emerges is important. This 
narrative will be the general tone that people remember about the event and will also likely 
largely inform the opinion of the public. Thus, having various narratives emerge along race 
and class categories becomes a key factor in crisis response due to the difficulty of addressing 
various narratives and opinions of the event. The #DayZero campaign was widely reported by 
media; however, the context was not always the same. As my interviews and media analysis 
show, many people felt that the media had ignored their experience of the drought and had also 
not reported on the reality that many low-income and poor communities face: chronic droughts. 
Which begs the question: if this is the reality of media representation in South Africa, how does 
Anderson’s conceptualization of a standardized print media which grounds the formation of 
the imagined nation hold up when there are sub-national communities? Holmes argues that, in 
South Africa, there are indeed sub-national communities because there is no single sovereign 
community. Because of translation and commensurability issues, the difference in print media 
by language poses various challenges for the formation of national identity. The emergence of 
several different narratives around an event prevents that of a single overarching narrative, 
which would disrupt Anderson’s idea around a national vocabulary and sharing of an event 




Holmes’ argument poses an interesting question when looking at the media coverage of ‘Day 
Zero’. As discussed previously, it is clear that the water shortage was not experienced 
homogenously. Factors such as infrastructure, resource allocation, city services, and political 
and social capital all contributed to how the drought was experienced. Although regulations 
(whether made at the state or provincial level) are applied to all who live within a specified 
boundary, not everyone is affected by regulation to the same extent. Something that was clear 
from the start of my research, and continued to be true throughout, was that the 50 litres a day 
water restriction was a reality for many before the DA’s announcement and remains a reality 
today. However, the announcement and implementation of the restriction received a lot of 
media attention only once people in the middle and upper classes were affected. People who 
live in informal settlements live with constant water restrictions, or what Vigh would refer to 
as ‘chronic crisis’ (2008). Even now that ‘Day Zero’ is off the radar, restrictions continue and 
access to water remains a crisis within these groups. However, there is no media coverage of 
this. There is no media-driven narrative that consistently monitors these conditions and reports 
on the hardship and stress of experience of having taps run dry, or no taps to run at all. The 
sub-nations that Holmes refers to is not only evident when looking at the influence of language 
in shaping narratives in news reporting, but also in other ways including the spatial geography 
of the city. The design of most large cities in South Africa is rooted in racialised city planning. 
As such, Cape Town’s city centre is largely made up of middle to upper class white 
neighbourhoods. As you leave the city centre you find your middle class white suburban 
neighbourhoods, and then past that on the fringe of the city, you start finding the poor, working 
class, and lower-income communities of colour. Past those neighbourhoods are usually 
informal settlements. The largest informal settlement in the Cape Town region is Khayelitsha, 
built during the Apartheid regime to segregate Black residents from whites. It is no accident 
that the planning and building of informal settlements only provided basic infrastructure. Since 
Khayelitsha was established in the 1980s, the area’s lack of sufficient access to water and 
electricity has persisted and has only worsened as more people have moved into the area. These 
communities are continuously under-serviced by local and national government. They have to 
contend with chronic realities of crisis that range beyond water shortage to poor sanitation 
services, high poverty levels, and lack of safe and decent housing. In this area, crisis is not 





Political philosopher Hannah Arendt writes that “the presence of others who see what we see 
and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves” (1958: 49-52). She 
continues:  
 
To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those 
who have it in common… the world, like every in between, relates and separates men 
at the same time (1958: 49-52).  
 
If we apply this quote and Arendt’s work to the drought, it would be fair to say that the ‘great 
equaliser’ at best only equalized the experience of those who was neither struggling with secure 
access to water nor lived on the social and political margins of Cape Town. But for those who 
did, the drought merely aggravated an already dire and chronic condition of crisis. In moments 
or events of crisis, it is often what people have in common that unites the experience and the 
response. The ‘common’ here could be geography, social class, or race. When looking at who 
is affected by a crisis and how they respond to crisis, people try to find ‘common ground’ – 
something that will characterise the group. In instances such as school shootings, it is a 
‘geographical common’ – people were in one area. It is again geographical in instances of 
devastating natural disaster. In the case of Apartheid, the common was characterised along 
racial classifications. When looking at ‘Day Zero’, on the surface the common was 
geographical. The focus was largely on the Western Cape, and Cape Town in particular. But 
when you start to look more closely and try to unravel the experience of the drought, it becomes 
less clear that the drought’s impact had such a ‘common ground’. It becomes clearer that the 
experience varied, depending on social class, race, and geographical location. Yet, when the 
crisis was addressed in the media, it was discussed as a common, a ‘great equaliser’. We all 
have to change our behaviour. We all have to work together. Media headlines and articles often 
shared this message. In an op-ed written on the 25th of March 2019 in City Press, Patricia de 
Lille (formerly of the DA, now leader of Good) writes “[l]ower-income families also 
disproportionately struggled to afford the uniform fixed pipe levy and high-water costs”. This 
quote refers to a levy implemented by the DA due to the decrease in revenue from levies the 
City was receiving based on reduced water consumption. The DA rejected a plan that would 
see ‘higher-income homes’ charged a levy to cover these costs and opted instead to go with the 
pipe levy that would be charged to all homes. Although De Lille does discuss the implications 
of this plan on inequality, arguing that low income homes often have more people living on 
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one property than your average wealthier household. However, in her solutions to “ensure that 
access is equitable and just”, she lists these three solutions:  
 
To protect our catchments and remove thirsty invasive alien trees. This will increase 
water in our rivers and also create rural jobs; 
To maintain infrastructure and reduce leak losses. Cape Town now has the second-
lowest losses of any city in the world; and 
To implement responsible debt management, so that those who can afford to pay do so, 
and those who legitimately need the support of our society and government receive it 
(De Lille quoted in City Press, 2019).  
 
Although these solutions are not necessarily bad, they neglect the reality of a broad approach 
to crisis which often comes up in similar ‘we all’ governance plans. How does crisis 
governance address the issues that existed prior to crisis? How does crisis management 
implement solutions that acknowledge and address the structural inequalities that make the 
experience of crisis more severe for some? Crisis often means there is a domino effect. In this 
instance, the water crisis presented a real economic threat to the DA, as their budget felt the 
strain of decreasing water usage. This resulted in implementation of a levy that unfairly 
burdened the poor. There were people in the community that felt that the DA’s handling of the 
water crisis was not in the best interest of the public, but rather a privatisation agenda of the 
DA and its big business allies. A group called the Water Crisis Coalition (WCC) strongly 
opposed privatisation and wanted to mobilise poor and working-class communities to protest 
against the levies and tariff hikes. A big issue for WCC was that the City was installing water 
management devices (WMD) in households that were exceeding the water allowance. The 
WCC would refer to the water management devices as ‘weapons of mass destruction’. They 
felt that the measures taken by the DA were to privatise water and not to prevent the taps from 
running dry. In fact, the WCC did not believe that ‘Day Zero’ was real; rather, they believed it 
was just an attempt to cause panic and allow the DA to commodify and privatise water (Robins, 
2019: 6).  
 
The water crisis was not only covered by local media, but several international news 
organizations took interest as well. Cape Town was said to be the first city that would run out 
of water, which drew significant media attention. Many people looked at Cape Town as an 
example of what would become the norm if climate change was not addressed urgently. As 
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such, the handling of the crisis was also measured in terms of its success and failure in case 
other cities experienced the same fate. In one article written in The Times (UK) titled “Wasteful 
wealth put Cape Town on brink of water crisis”, the author begins by writing “The man asked 
to manage Cape Town's water emergency has more experience dealing with gangsters than 
organising a city that could be the first in the world in which the taps run dry” (Laing, 2018). 
The author goes on to explain and call into question how effective JP Smith, who at the time 
was the head of Safety and Security for the DA, would be at handling the crisis. According to 
the article, JP Smith said that “residents in affluent areas were responsible for the most flagrant 
flouting of rules intended to eke out existing supplies for as long as possible. In the coming 
days he intends to send vans fitted with loudhailers into the exclusive wine-growing areas of 
Constantia and Bishopscourt home to, among others, Lady Kitty Spencer, niece of Diana, 
Princess of Wales” (Laing, 2018). In this article, the coverage of the water crisis is framed as 
a ‘class war’. Throughout it, the writer focuses on how the middle to upper classes are being 
targeted by water saving interventions. If read in isolation, one could assume that only the 
wealthy are responsible for the crisis and are being restricted by government. The article neither 
includes a discussion on inequality of access, nor even addresses the fact that poverty exists. 
At one point the article cites JP Smith: “Mr Smith said the Day Zero water collection points 
would be ‘incredibly disruptive’ but added: ‘I think these crises bring you closer together. 
Having the very rich and the very poor queuing next to each other at water points might build 
some social cohesion’” (2018: 1). Despite this statement from Smith, the author does not 
engage with the reality of “having the very rich and very poor queuing together”. This 
statement again evokes the idea that the drought is a ‘great equaliser’. Yet, if you look at the 
reality of the drought and the plans to have people queue to collect water, it is evident that the 
rich and poor would not in fact be queuing together. The article does not engage with the 
challenges of needing to queue for water when you are poor. The infrastructural inequalities 
that already prevent poor communities from having equal access to water relative to richer 
communities would serve to keep those communities separate. A concern for many people who 
had been collecting water at the Kildare Road spring was that they could not afford to leave 
work to do so, or did not have the physical means to collect water every day to supply their 
entire household.  
 
Not only did these concerns come up with the participants of this study, but also on social 
media when the DA released the ‘Day Zero’ contingency plan. Yet there was hardly any media 
coverage about this reality. Additionally, I found the mention of Lady Kitty Spencer 
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interesting. What is the relevance of mentioning Princess Diana in this context? Is this an 
attempt to appeal to the newspaper’s audience (The Times’ target market is not South African 
readers, but those in the United Kingdom)? Is the aim to create an image of someone close to 
royalty being reduced to having to stand in line, her status and wealth obsolete? The reality is 
that queuing for water is not only a reality during severe droughts, it is the everyday reality for 
many South Africans. Yet this article, and media coverage in general, neglects this reality, 
despite the challenges it presents to the ‘great equaliser’ narrative.   
 
On the 24th of January 2018, BBC News published an article titled “Cape Town water crisis: 
‘My wife doesn’t shower any more’”. The article was written by Mohammed Allie, who works 
for the BBC. After writing his account of his household no longer showering, but rather using 
buckets to wash and then collect water for the toilet cistern, Allie turns his discussion to the 
water collection points in Cape Town. He writes that “Water has clearly become the new gold 
of Cape Town” (Allie, 2018). Further down he writes “The city has had to be firm in enforcing 
its limits on residents. Failure to comply could result in the installation of a water-management 
device, that strictly limits consumption to 350 litres per day, with the homeowner having to 
foot the 4 500 Rand ($378; £265) installation bill” (Ibid). Allie also mentions the anger that 
people feel when they see people ignoring the regulations and are “hosing down their 
pavements or their cars with impunity and in contravention of local regulations”. Again, this 
article neither mentions the rampant inequality, the disproportionate allocation of 
infrastructure, nor how the drought has not affected everyone to the same extent. Allie mentions 
that “Those with more money - and who are not prepared to endure the Newlands queues - can 
be seen filling up trolleys in supermarkets with five litre bottles of mineral water in an effort 
to augment their supply as they try to remain within consumption limits”. However, there is no 
enquiry beyond this short paragraph. There is no attempt to contextualise the stark reality of 
people who can afford to stock their homes with water bought from grocery stores, and those 
who are entirely dependent on collecting water from communal taps, often located a fair 
distance from their homes.  
 
Out of the 20 international media articles I considered, only one questioned the validity of the 
‘rainbow nation’ narrative that was frequently used during the water crisis. The majority of 
coverage either focused or emphasised that the water shortage was being experienced the same 
by all, and that it brought a measure of equality to a highly unequal society. The prevalence of 
these types of messages was interesting to me. What was it about these themes and images that 
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caught the attention of international media? This narrative is not new, however. The coverage 
of the #DayZero campaign had similar themes to the international coverage of the end of 
Apartheid in 1994. The visual representation of post-apartheid South Africa was done by means 
of photographs showing long lines of people of varied races queuing to vote. These images 
have come to symbolise the hope and the possibility of equality and democracy in the new 
South African Republic, where all were seen as equal under the law and state. However, this 
media construction obscures more than it reveals. The end of Apartheid and the advent of South 
Africa’s democracy with the voting in of the ANC in April 1994 saw immediate political, social 
and economic reforms. But some of these reforms, especially regarding socio-economic rights 
and equality, remain elusive. An argument can be made that even now, 25 years later, several 
social and economic reforms are still yet to happen. To a large extent, Cape Town in particular 
is socially and economically segregated: the legacies of apartheid spatial planning persist. 
There has been no remarkable transformation in terms of land or property ownership. 
 
The water crisis and access to water are very much intertwined with these issues. On the 12th 
of February 2018, News24 published an article titled “Day Zero is a myth, says protesters 
looking to fill up at Zille’s residence”. The article covers a small protest that occurred in front 
of Zille’s residence in which protestor and activist, Shaheed Mohammed, claimed that “[t]he 
City is deliberately creating scarcity, scaring the people about the Day Zero” (Evans, 2018). 
The protestors argued that the scarcity narrative was being used to drive up tariffs so the City 
could profit, and argued that the 70 springs around Cape Town should be freely accessible to 
the public and the locked sites should be opened (Evans, 2018). Helen Zille responded to the 
Tweet on News24’s page and said “Believe me, Day Zero is not a myth. We are going to have 
to work very hard not to reach level 7 water restrictions - which is when water is rationed and 
we have to queue for it. That transition has been called Day Zero. Ppl are now taking it 
seriously” (Zille, 2018). However, that was the precise issue. Many felt like they could not 
trust the DA or Zille. In her paper ‘Narrating Apocalypse: Cape Town’s “Day Zero” and the 
Politics of Climate Change Attribution’, Eve Driver wrote that it was only once the drought 
became a disaster that behaviour began to change (2020: 33). According to Driver, research 
done by Stellenbosch University showed that despite the restrictions being imposed and 
ramped up several times since 2017/2018, it was only once the DA announced their Disaster 
Plan in which they outlined what would happen when the taps ran dry that a significant drop 
in consumption was observed. The reason for this sudden change? The media frenzy that 
followed the Disaster Plan’s release (Driver, 2020: 33). The question of access, to springs and 
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to Zille’s residence, is tied to access to housing, sanitation, safety, as well as social and political 
mobility. But these questions around access are crucial in understanding how chronic 
conditions of poverty and inaccessibility contribute to the understanding of crisis. News 
agencies are stakeholders in this conversation.  
 
The question of land remains a sensitive issue. However, looking at the question of land and 
the water crisis is enlightening because it shows the authority that land ownership gives people. 
The discrepancies in narrative connects back to Hannah Arendt’s theory of the ‘sub-nations’. 
Media no longer circulates in closed communities. Rather, due to the internet and global 
communication infrastructure, media is accessible internationally. Morning headlines no 
longer only focus on national happenings, but global news as well. Most large news media 
groups have entire sections dedicated to global/international news and have representatives 
across the globe. As such, the facts of a story may be broadcasted far and wide, but the narrative 
is not necessarily treated the same. The ‘rainbow nation’ lens on the water crisis was a theme 
picked up locally and internationally, but it was very rarely evoked on the ground.  
 
In all my time at the Kildare Road spring and talking to people throughout this research process, 
the crisis was not mentioned as a moment for the ‘rainbow nation’ to come together. Rather, 
the idea itself was criticised and rejected. At one point while I was at the spring, I brought the 
idea up to someone in line waiting to collect water. He was a slightly older man, with a robust 
body, a heavy brow, and his voice carried far. He did not want his name mentioned, so I will 
refer to him as Sam. Sam told me that he was from an area called Crawford, which was roughly 
seven or eight kilometres away. He had not been collecting water here long, he said, only for a 
few months. He said he heard about the spring from someone in his Mosque and decided one 
day to take a drive and collect water because the restrictions were hard on his family. He told 
me they were a household of five and that his elderly mom stayed with them. His mom had 
dementia and struggled to remember that there were strict water restrictions in place. She did 
not always understand why she could not have a bath, and when she did, why very little water 
was poured in. When left unattended, he said, she would fill the bath almost to the middle. He 
came to collect water to use for cooking and dishes mostly. However, his household felt that 
the water from the spring tasted better than tap water, so they had also started drinking it. His 
wife preferred to boil the water and then drink it “just in case”. I asked him what he thought 
about the idea of the crisis bringing the ‘rainbow nation’ together. He scoffed. I am not sure if 




What rainbow nation? Some people here come because it’s nice. There is an atmosphere 
and it’s ‘cool’ to be collecting water nowadays. But when it’s busy or too hot those 
people can go to the shops and buy their five litre bottles of water. Some of us are here 
because our choices are limited. We can’t afford our water bills and are trying to do 
what we can to keep them down. This isn’t about fashion for us. It’s what we need to 
do to get through this drought (Sam, April 2018).  
 
I ask Sam if he thinks the drought will end or if this is the new normal. He answers bluntly and 
says: “This is government mismanagement”. By now we are next in line and he says goodbye 
as he steps forward with his containers and begins filling them. I try to catch up with Sam again 
before he leaves, but once his bottles are filled, he tells me he has to leave. His mom is home 
alone and he needs to get back to her.  
 
Sam is not the only person I spoke to that felt this way. Most of my formal and informal 
conversations about the drought and the spring had similar themes. As opposed to the narrative 
around the drought, the main diversion in views was more focused on the cause or reasons for 
it. Largely, people fit into three categories regarding their understanding of the reasons for the 
drought. The first is climate change and changing weather patterns. The second is poor rainfall 
for two consecutive winter seasons, and the third is some sort of government mismanagement 
of resources and planning. When I asked about the media portrayal of the drought, most people 
said they had stopped following the news. One woman posed the question: “Why must we 
follow the news when we are experiencing these things everyday”. This posed an interesting 
question for my research because it brought into dispute the notion that, through news, an 
uncontested narrative can be created. However, at this point the water crisis had been an issue 
for almost two years, which contributed to the fatigue and perhaps apathy towards the news.  
 
When asked about the coverage of the Kildare Road spring specifically, respondents felt that 
the coverage was welcomed, but not always accurate. They said it raised awareness about the 
importance of the spring but did not always cover the community element that made the spring 
unique. The coverage mostly focused on the free access to water. A woman I spoke to, Samika, 
said that she was happy about the awareness of the spring, but added that “they don’t tell people 
that this is a place where we come to collect water and catch up with people we know”. When 
I ask how often she sees people she knows here she said, “It depends. If I come during the 
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week during working hours, it’s quieter, and maybe I won’t see someone. But if I come on the 
weekend, especially Saturday mornings, I’ll see more than one family member I know”. When 
I asked how she knew about the spring, she said her father had a friend that had been collecting 
water here for some time. He brought them water one day to try and, since then, they had started 
coming themselves. She said if she could not get a lift here with her father or husband, she 
would get a lift from a neighbour or friend who also collected water here. She mentioned that 
if one of their neighbours had not been able to come that week, they would take and fill up a 
few of their bottles for them, even if it meant having to go back and forth to their car several 
times. Samika added “I don’t mind because I know they would do it for me too. Anyone here 
would do the same if you asked. Someone is always willing to help”. This account reminds me 
of discussions with Riyaaz Rawoot who, when talking to him about the spring, always 
mentioned that it was a community resource that brought people together.  
 
In local media, the narrative is a bit more varied and touches on some of the more nuanced 
issues of access to water. The idea of a united nation is questioned and argued from various 
perspectives, allowing for a more complete picture to form. I could find just a few local news 
articles that mentioned or reported on the conditions in informal settlements.1 Although there 
are instances where people do come together – and there appears to be a sense of common 
struggle or experience, the reality of climate change and access to resources differ and in 
themselves can create or promote division. In a moment of self-reflection, I had to admit that 
although this project is important to me, my daily experiences of the crisis, and the post-crisis 
period, are vastly different compared to most of the people I spoke to at the spring. As 
restrictions have eased and life has returned to some normalcy, I worry about water in terms of 
climate change and changing weather patterns, but not really at the level of my household’s 
access to water. Our household water behaviour has definitely changed, and my family and 
myself are more aware about how we use water, but we have certainly relaxed the monitoring 
of our usage since 2018. The flat that we rent includes water in the rental fee, so we do not see 
 
1 Cheslow, C., 2018. Every Day Seems Like 'Day Zero' To Some Cape Town Residents. [online] Npr.org. 
Available at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/03/13/592925986/water-shortages-are-nothing-
new-to-some-folks-in-cape-town>  
 Tswanya, Y., 2018. #Watercrisis Reality Starts To Hit Township Residents. [online] Iol.co.za. Available at: 
<https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/watercrisis-reality-starts-to-hit-township-residents-13031592>  





the water bill and can’t be exactly sure how much we are using and how much it costs. So for 
the most part, we get to turn a blind eye to the lasting implications of the water crisis.  
 
For many, the Kildare Road spring was a way to circumvent the increasing water tariffs to 
some extent. There are no entry or usage fees to collect water (although someone on a Facebook 
group suggested a R10 entry fee to keep “low lives” away and encourage people to “take care 
of the place”). However, for many, the cost of water is still an issue. People are still 
complaining that the City is measuring their consumption incorrectly and charging them too 
much. People are still struggling to adjust to the increase in tariffs. On the 19th of November 
2019, Mark Rountree wrote an article for the Mail and Guardian titled “Cape Town’s water 
tariffs are unfair and penalise the poor”. In the article, he writes that “residents in lower income 
areas like Hanover Park and Khayelitsha pay far more per person than residents from affluent 
areas like Camps Bay”. He further explains that the DA would exempt households that use less 
than 6 000 litres of water per month from the new tariff system. However, usage over 6 000 
litres would mean an exponential increase in tariffs. For example, in an area such as Camps 
Bay, the average household consists of two people. The cost of their 6 000 litres would be 
roughly R51 per person per month. However, in Khayelitsha the average household consists of 
four people. They would be paying R61 per person. In Hanover Park a “typical five-person 
home” would be paying R73 per person, which is 37% more than someone living in Camps 
Bay. In this area, household income is estimated to be around 10% less than people who live 
in Camps Bay. These figures were calculated using the 2017/2018 DA budget when the drought 
was subsiding, yet for the 2019/2020 budget the DA voted to raise the cost of water again 
(Rountree, 2019). During a crisis, decisions are made quickly, as time is of the essence. This 
often means that it is difficult to keep track of policy changes or adaptions. A core role of media 
is to mediate the space between government and citizens, and ensure people are kept informed. 
For these reasons it is crucial that the media is representative. Although the DA made their 
budget publicly available, the document is dense and difficult to digest. Mark Rountree’s article 
is an example of the role media can play in keeping people informed of decisions that are made 
by public officials on behalf of the people who elected them. However, at times the media 
becomes a vehicle for information and opposition, as they offer more bite-sized information 
that is more easily understood. But not everyone is reading the Mail and Guardian.  
 
Access to information is not equal, and the extent of access amongst those who have it is not 
homogenous. As Carolyn E. Holmes points out above, often in South Africa narratives differ 
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depending on language, and language is often coupled with race and class. The people most 
likely to be negatively affected by the increasing water tariffs are not necessarily reading the 
news that is breaking down the budget of the city. Due to financial, location, and language 
constraints, news distribution can differ substantially. Moreover, as news is being distributed 
and consumed online more, paywalls have become more common. I was required to pay R4 to 
read “Cape Town’s water tariffs are unfair and penalise the poor” (Rountree, 2020). How does 
this contribute to our ability to share nationhood through news, and how varied narratives are 
developing? If finance is a deterring factor to access, ultimately a large group of South Africans 
will be excluded. Online news paywall structures effectively make news a “luxury” commodity 
based on who can afford to pay for recurring subscriptions. If the media acts as a watchdog and 
one needs to subscribe to benefit from their services, who is the media ‘watchdogging’ for? In 
Rountree’s article, he writes “Inexplicably, councillors like Booi and Kleinsmith acted to 
penalise the communities they were elected to protect”, referring to the councillors that voted 
against the progressive tariff structure because the City would lose too much money from their 
budget, and the burden would fall on higher-income households, which was deemed “unfair” 
(Rountree, 2019). The issues raised in the article affect lower-income areas disproportionately, 
yet the article is very likely not accessible to those that reside within these areas.  
 
In their 2013 article, Ian Glenn and Robert Mattes provide important insights into the content 
and structure of the media industry in South Africa. How the media industry operates and 
identifies a target audience is important to this study as it contributes to how representative 
narratives are formed, and how segregated news can be. In their article, Glenn and Mattes write 
the following:  
 
Any politically interested foreigner visiting South Africa from the developed world 
would see and hear much in the country’s mass communications infrastructure that 
would appear familiar. Much of this is due to the country’ s colonial legacy, which 
shaped both the country’s media and political models. The oldest newspaper, for 
example, the Cape Times, as well as the state broadcaster, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) overtly modelled themselves… on British Originals. 
(2012: 1).  
 
The authors then go on to say that for many Black South Africans, the media landscape is 
limited to a few television shows or newspapers that are published in their first language. This 
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often means that their choice of news source is limited. However, for those whose first language 
is English, the media landscape has “almost unlimited choice, and a diminishing sense of 
national conversation or shared political destiny” (Glenn & Mattes, 2012: 2). This information 
is crucial for this project because it identifies a key issue about the different realities people 
experience through media.  
 
Glenn and Mattes’ study shows that white South Africans have largely stopped watching news 
on SABC, often due to a dislike or distrust of the local news. Instead, many have moved over 
to privatized satellite television which provides several other news broadcasts from local and 
international media houses. This has resulted in the SABC having predominantly Black South 
African audience who are more able to access this free news source relative to private television 
alternatives. Furthermore, their paper shows that newspaper readership is nearly double as high 
amongst white South Africans (87% of white responders said they read newspapers often) 
relative to Black South Africans (48%) (Glenn & Mattes, 2012: 9-10). However, the opposite 
is true when looking at the levels of physical engagement, particularly in terms of collective 
action. Glenn and Mattes (2012) also find that, relative to their white counterparts, Black South 
Africans are three times more likely to attend elections rallies, go to community meetings, and 
join outreach groups to raise awareness in their communities. Black South Africans are also 
more likely to contact leaders and follow the formal guides for engaging with political 
representatives (Glenn & Mattes, 2012:10). The authors use race as a proxy for social class due 
to the historical legacy of wealth distribution, but it is also important to note that racial 
classifications in the article as well as in this paper are themselves legacies of Apartheid and 
the National Party’s (NP) agenda to categorize people by skin colour. This was a necessary 
tool of the NP as they needed racial classifications in order to effectively enforce racial 
segregation and oppression policies and agendas.  
 
According to Glenn and Mattes, at the time of writing their article, the SABC was one of the 
world’s largest news organizations partly due to the fact that they needed to broadcast in 11 
official languages on both radio and television. At the time, the SABC had a staff total of close 
to 1 000. Due to limited access to news alternatives in languages other than English or 
Afrikaans, the SABC is credited to have played a huge role in the formation of political 
perceptions of four in every five South Africans. This has caused the SABC to be a source of 
contention around partisan and ideological clashes, which has also caused internal conflict for 
almost two decades. During South Africa’ post-apartheid era, the SABC has undergone much 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 44 
transformation, but many of these transformations - especially under President Mbeki - has 
made people perceive the SABC to have a pro-ANC bias. When Snuki Zikalala became the 
head of the SABC, suspicions grew further as they were believed to be an ANC ‘propagandist’. 
Suspicions similarly grew when the SABC did not cover the booing of Deputy President 
Phumzile Mlambo-Mgcuka at a rally, and instead chose to blacklist journalists and political 
commentators who seemed to have views “contrary to the SABC preferences” (Glenn & 
Mattes, 2012: 13).  
 
For many white South Africans, this signified that the SABC would not cover ‘their’ interests, 
and as such sought out more privatised and international news organizations. This idea of 
‘their’ interests being separate from other – presumably referring to mostly Black South 
Africans – interests stood out to me. There is somewhat of an ingrained belief that the concerns 
of white and Black South Africans are not the same. The response to the ‘great equaliser’ 
narrative highlights this. For many middle- and upper-class white families, the idea of queuing 
for water and needing to live off 50 litres of water a day was foreign. But it allowed those who 
live privileged lives, often ignorant of the conditions of the marginalised, to ‘see how the other 
side lives.’ I think it’s fair to say that they did not like what they saw. Having to contend with 
the water crisis made the reality of poor and low-income families more concrete to some, yet 
this was not the narrative that was prioritised. Frequently, people would complain and criticise 
the DA for their handling of the water crisis, but the focus remained on how the crisis was 
affecting everyone. Those who live privileged lives had an opportunity where they could have 
added their voice to those who live in constant states of slow violence – who chronically face 
water scarcity – and have criticised the CoCT and the DA for the persistent lack of access to 
resources. In moments of crisis, this form of ‘media segregation’ furthers the sub-national 
narratives, and the reporting and documenting of experience begins to take on varied 
portrayals.  
 
As discussed above, my research has showed that the media coverage, or lack of coverage of 
the crisis often highlighted inequality, but not much has happened to address it. Now, almost 
two years since the crisis has ‘ended’, many parts of Cape Town are still living with ‘Day Zero’ 
restrictions. As a result of the restrictive water tariffs and lack of infrastructure, many poor 
households continue to be forced to use significantly less water than the average household, 
and they still have to collect water from communal taps. For others, water usage is dictated by 
budget, and every attempt is made to keep water consumption levels low enough to avoid being 
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punished by unfair tariffs. The attempts that were made to address these issues of inequality 
during the drought seem to have run dry. Similar to before the water crisis, people who now 
have to collect their water, or restrict their usage to a certain amount, continue to live with the 




5. Social media and the challenges to narratives of crisis 
 
As the drought progressed throughout 2017, the role of social media became increasingly 
important. This was largely due to the conversations that were happening on platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and Whatsapp. With engagement increasing on these platforms, it became 
necessary for the CoCT to have a clearly formulated strategy for communication through these 
platforms. This resulted in the #DayZero campaign, created as a social media-focused 
marketing strategy that would be widely shared through several platforms, ultimately seeking 
to change water perceptions and behaviour. 
 
Social media has fundamentally changed the way we take in and produce news. Access to smart 
phones and social media platforms have created what Seeger and Sellnow (2013) call “citizen 
journalism” – a development that is attributable to the prominence of individuals documenting 
the everyday and extraordinary events that happen around them across the globe. Social media 
has become so prolific that it often becomes the topic of mainstream media news itself. In a 
world where the frequency of crisis events is increasing, social media allows for the direct 
engagement around the management and communication of crisis. Moreover, social media has 
eroded the idea of a singular truth or experience, as people are now able to document their own 
experiences and post ‘evidence’ that may go against what is being reported by officials and 
traditional media. It can also undermine the legitimacy and hegemony of ‘orthodox’ science 
and expertise – for instance, through the rapid, widespread dissemination of conspiracy 
theories, such as those attributed to QAnon. Social media also has changed the way people 
mobilize around events, such as the 2016 and 2020 US elections and the 2019 marches against 
Gender Based Violence in South Africa. By considering social media platforms such as 
Twitter, Facebook, and Whatsapp, this chapter will show that during the Cape Town drought, 
not only did people use these social media platforms to share ideas and tips to bypass 
mainstream media restrictions or regulations, but also to voice their opinions and push back 
against certain aspects of the drought management strategies introduced by the DA. The 
chapter will also analyse the specific role social media plays for organisations during crisis 
management, and how social media messaging is directed. Etter and Vestergaard’s 2015 article 
about an NGO’s use of Facebook to address deforestation will be used as an example to 
understand similar issues that emerged in terms of social media responses during ‘Day Zero’. 
Critical to this project, this chapter will also document how social media has become a tool for 
marginalised (as well as middle class) communities that allows them to document the reality 
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of chronic crisis and draw attention to the endemic nature of water shortages faced by many 
communities across Cape Town. 
 
Social media has become an important tool in governance. It allows for direct communication 
with large groups of people at a low cost. Creating a Twitter, Facebook, or Whatsapp account 
is free. The requirements are that you have a phone that can support these apps and access to 
the internet or data. It is also for these reasons that social media is used widely in South Africa. 
The cost of entry is fairly low. However, issues begin to arise when you try to understand how 
social media profiles and information are perceived. Social media profiles, especially those of 
government agencies and corporations, depend on reputation. On platforms that frequently 
streamline so much information to the user, your communication has to be accurate, clear, and 
concise. The amount of people that follow you also depends on your reputation as an 
organisation outside of social media applications. Particularly in times of crisis, the ability to 
have people adhere to your message often depends on forms of engagement which occur 
outside of social media (Ramluckan, 2016: 2). This was an issue for the CoCT during the ‘Day 
Zero’ crisis.  
 
The City was (and continues to be) governed by the DA. For many, that in itself was a problem 
as political party affiliation in South Africa is often discussed in ways that reflect the 
persistence of Apartheid political legacies. Understandably, there are issues around trust, 
belonging, and identity when it comes to political parties in South Africa. For many, the DA, 
particularly in the early 2000s, was largely perceived as a reincarnation of a whites-only party 
(Southall, 2019: para 1). The party leadership was largely white, and their following was also 
largely white. For some, this was comforting. For others, it was alienating. Despite these 
perceptions having changed over the last two decades, this narrative often surfaces on social 
media. Large groups of people felt that the DA was not serving or representing them (Southall, 
2019: para 1-2). Other groups of people felt that the DA was doing its best, and its best was 
better than what any other political party could offer.  
 
In late October 2019, the leader of the DA, Mmusi Maimane, resigned as leader and member, 
causing an eruption of this narrative not only on social media, but in traditional media as well. 
Many felt that Maimane was not given the chance to be the ‘true’ leader of the party and was 
merely the face of a party that needed to attract a more ‘diverse’ vote. Behind the scenes the 
former leader, Helen Zille and even Tony Leon were still at the helm and making the decisions 
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which were often in disagreement with Maimane’s vision (Southall, 2019 & Suttner, 2020). 
The biggest point of contention seemed to concern race, and the tug of war between being a 
‘non-racial’ party and a party that recognises that race needs to be an important factor in 
governance. The ‘new’ and ‘old’ leadership seemed to struggle with finding consensus on how 
to diversify and include more people in the party, which ultimately led to a ‘messy divorce’. In 
the aftermath of Maimane’s resignation, there were several matches of the blame game played, 
with no one walking away as a clear winner. A commission membered by Ryan Coetzee, Tony 
Leon, and Michiel le Roux found that “the notion of representivity is incompatible with the 
values of the DA”, and likewise, the DA policy document rejects “race as a way to categorise 
people and to understand their experiences” (Suttner, 2020: para 2). However, race cannot be 
ignored when considering how the DA managed the water crisis. As mentioned previously, the 
chronic water shortage experienced in Cape Town was largely happening to Black and Brown 
communities. The DA’s Water Disaster Plan specifically included target installation of Water 
Management Devices in low-income homes (Roeland, 2018:1). As such, the experiences of 
these communities became a large part of the discussion around the drought amongst social 
media users and often popped up in the comment section of the DA’s social media posts 
regarding the drought. The DA’s social media platforms, particularly Twitter, testifies to the 
lack of trust or the sense of exclusion that some people experience. In a recent tweet, someone 
commented “The DA is the motherbody of afriforum [sic]” (Twitter user, October 2020). 
Another comment reads “@SollyMsimanga, @Makashule, @mbalimcdust and other black 
leaders, please answer this: how do the white leaders in your party understand the challenges 
faced by the black majority in our country? And how do [these] white leaders articulate what 
they don't know?” (Twitter user, October 2020). As these comments show, the feelings of 
mistrust or lack of representation within the party has and continues to be an issue for the DA, 
especially on their social media platforms. According to Ramluckan (2016), there are seven 
‘dimensions’ of quality social media information: “integrity, consistency, completeness, 
validity, timeliness, relevancy, and accuracy” (2016: 4). For the user, there is an analysis of 
these qualities that determine how the post is received. For some, the DA as a party missed one 
or more of these dimensions from the start. Many felt that the DA were not the right party to 
manage the crisis and called for national government, run by the African National Congress 
(ANC), to take over the crisis management. Others were repelled by that idea and felt that only 
the DA could be trusted to manage the crisis effectively. The conversation around the DA’s 
management of the water crisis often predated the actual drought. People frequently brought 
up the fact that certain communities in the Cape area were chronically under-serviced by the 
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party. I found over 50 tweet comments between the period of 1 January 2018 – 31 May 2018 
where people brought up or complained about service delivery from the DA.  
 
One particularly salient characteristic of social media is that it is often difficult to recall or 
know for certain when something starts. In a time where something ‘going viral’ can happen 
so quickly and widely, it becomes difficult to determine its origins. The #DayZero campaign 
was created for social media. The #DayZero campaign was created to go viral. Messages were 
shared so often and widely by so many users that it became less about who started the campaign 
and more about the aims of the campaign. For many, this may appear to be a success story. The 
hashtag became the slogan of a national campaign to bring awareness to the drought and to 
behaviour around water use. Although concentrated in the Western Cape, the narrative spread 
and it stopped exclusively being a local issue and became a national and international matter 
of concern. However, the campaign’s hyper-focus on Cape Town’s water crisis in particular 
obscured the fact that other parts of the country were also experiencing a drought. In places 
like the Karoo and the Eastern Cape, ‘Day Zero’ was already a reality, but did not receive the 
same media or political attention.2 The amount of coverage and attention the campaign received 
was a major factor in “preventing day zero from happening” (Democratic Alliance, 2018: 1). 
The end of the press statement released on their Twitter account on 8 June 2018 states, “Let’s 
continue to work together and stay reminded that 50 litres has become the new normal” (Ibid). 
This sentence immediately stood out to me. Having limited (in this case, 50 litres) access to 
water was not a ‘new’ normal. It had been a reality for years for people living in informal 
settlements. This take by the DA on the water crisis focused on the reality of the middle class 
and their experience of the crisis, for whom it largely was a ‘new normal’. However, it rendered 
the experiences of large groups of low-income communities invisible. In one sweeping 
statement, the DA implied that those who experience chronic water crisis were not targets for 
the #DayZero campaign, because it was already their daily lived reality.  
 
2  Sizani, M. and Stent, J. (2020). Port Elizabeth’S Day Zero: A Result Of Poor Planning And A Failure To Fix 
Leaks | News24. [online] News24. Available at: <https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/port-
elizabeths-day-zero-a-result-of-poor-planning-and-a-failure-to-fix-leaks-20200922> [Accessed 15 October 
2020]. 
The Mail & Guardian. (2018). Day Zero Stalks Eastern Cape’S Towns. [online] Available at: 
<https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-02-00-day-zero-stalks-eastern-capes-towns/> [Accessed 15 October 2020]. 
 Caboz, J. (2019). Dramatic Satellite Images Show Graaff-Reinet’S Supply Dam Drying Up – And Three Other 
SA Dams On The Verge Of Running Empty. [online] Businessinsider.co.za. Available at: 
https://www.businessinsider.co.za/dramatic-satellite-images-show-graaff-reinets-supply-dam-
drying-up-and-three-other-sa-dams-on-the-verge-of-running-empty-rhenosterkop-nqweba-





For decades, more than 80% of South Africans were seen as ‘second-class citizens’, their rights 
severely compromised, and their views deemed unimportant. Social media has in many ways 
changed this. If you can start a social media page, you can ‘have a voice’. It is for this reason 
that makes looking at how social media was used during the water crisis so important. Social 
media allowed people to directly interact with the CoCT in a way that had previously been 
challenging. Citizens could push back on what the City was saying, doing, and portraying. 
There was no single narrative that could be stuck to, because everyone who had a smartphone 
could be a reporter, photographer, or journalist. The water crisis became a catalyst for Facebook 
and Whatsapp groups to form with the aim of reporting and sharing news and information 
about ‘Day Zero’. This posed an interesting challenge to the crisis. With the emergence of a 
wide array of varying narratives, images, experiences, and accounts, I found it more and more 
difficult to find out what the ‘truth’ or main focus of engagement was. Given that information 
was spread so quickly and widely through these platforms, the origins of the information got 
lost so quickly and it became almost impossible to keep up with the social media coverage of 
the drought. Images of empty dams and dry rivers went viral but would disappear as quickly 
as they appeared, being replaced by the next shock value image.  
 
Social media was used to document everyday use (or lack) of infrastructure on a scale that has 
not been seen before. Susan Star writes that infrastructures are usually mundane and boring 
when they are operating normally. People are not likely to notice infrastructures when they are 
functioning. It is at the point of breakdown, lack, or inefficiencies that they are brought into 
the spotlight (1999: 378-379). Star goes on to explain that these issues or points of breakdown 
are often built into the infrastructure, because infrastructure is strategically placed. They do not 
just appear – they are scheduled, mapped, and analysed for cost. There are time frames and 
construction tenders, which means that they hold important information about how cities and 
towns work. Star writes: “[s]tudy a city and neglect its sewers and power supplies, and you 
have missed essential aspects of distributional justice and planning power” (1999: 3). This 
became increasingly evident throughout the water crisis. Ordinary people started studying 
infrastructure because they had come face-to-face with a breakdown that threatened their daily 
reality. Photographs of plastic bottles and water tanks and empty pools were widely shared on 
social media. These mundane objects soon became the symbols of a crisis that would erase the 
inequalities that existed in Cape Town. No one could live without water; everyone was in the 




Confronted by the potential reality of taps running dry, many turned to voicing their beliefs or 
opinions through ways that were familiar: social media. Most of the people I spoke to about 
this said they already had social media platforms prior to the drought, and it was an easy, 
accessible tool for them to use to share their views on the drought and how it was managed. It 
did not require much effort or planning, and often they did not plan what they were going to 
say prior to posting. This was interesting, although not surprising, to hear. Out of the ten people 
I spoke to about their social media activity, nine said they had posted something to do with the 
drought. Mostly they said they had shared a news article on Facebook or Whatsapp. Out of that 
nine, seven said they had taken a picture of collecting water at the Kildare Road spring to share 
with friends and family. The one person who had not shared something on social media said 
that they “did not see the point. Everyone knew about the drought and knew the reality” 
(Research participant, April 2018). The public could afford to take a more nonchalant approach 
to their engagement on social media because they did not face the same risks to their reputation. 
The CoCT, along with other government officials, however, had to have meticulously planned, 
strategic posts. Their language had to be carefully evaluated, spelling and grammar checks had 
to be done. The DA have guidelines set by the South African government in 2011 that provides 
a framework on how social media is to be used in official government capacities. The document 
states that “[as] public servants, however, government employees have some additional 
obligations when it comes to sustaining, building and defending the reputation of government 
through social media” (Social Media Policy Guidelines, 2011: 4).  This got me thinking about 
how to study social media. In her article Ethnography of Infrastructure, Star poses the question 
“Perhaps most important of all, what values and ethical principles do we inscribe in the inner 
depths of the built information environment?” (1999: 3). How was I going to interpret these 
social media posts, and how would I assign importance or weight to them? On a forum such as 
Twitter, there is a built-in popularity index. If people agree with your view, you are likely to 
experience more ‘retweets’ and ‘likes’. As these indicators increase, your Tweet can appear on 
the ‘Top’ page, which means your post is viewed by an algorithm as important or a standout 
post. Tweets do not move as quickly under the ‘Top’ page. Under the ‘Latest’ page, tweets get 
buried quickly as other posts with the same hashtag are filtered by time of posting. So how 
does this work? Understanding social media algorithms can be confusing because, by nature, 
they change frequently and are usually back-facing, so it can be challenging to find information 
that is accurate. This algorithm is the infrastructure of social media (Inouye & Kalita, 2011). It 
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is the networks of pipes, wires, channels, and connections that we cannot see or do not notice, 
until we have to. Similar to physical infrastructure, Star writes that  
 
People commonly envision infrastructure as a system, of substrates - railroad lines, 
pipes and plumbing, electrical power plants, and wires. It is by definition invisible, 
part of the background for other kinds of work. It is ready - to - hand. This image holds 
up well enough for many purposes- turn on the faucet for a drink of water and you use 
a vast infrastructure of plumbing and water regulation without usually thinking much 
about it (1999: 4). 
 
These ‘substrates of infrastructure’ apply to social media as well. Usually a Tweet, Facebook 
post, or Whatsapp message is just that: a collection of words strung together and sent into 
the world with the push of a button. But what enables that message? There is an entire 
physical apparatus that enables that communication to occur. There are electrical lines, cell 
phone towers, and underground cables which supports the transmission of that message. But 
there is also a different network at play. A network of semantics, word choice, language 
barriers, and ability to communicate concisely. These networks, largely unseen, are crucial 
to how you end up under the ‘Top’ page on Twitter.  
 
Having a strong relationship with your following or audience is key in crisis communication. 
The strength of this relationship plays an important role in the longevity of a brand. Reynolds 
and Seeger write that the “need for skilled communicators to strategically defend and explain 
the organisation’s position in the face of crisis-induced criticism, threat, and uncertainty” is 
vital in crisis communication (2005: 44). In light of this and the challenges that the CoCT faced 
in terms of their social media reach during the water crisis, a company was brought in to assist. 
According to Rebecca Davis who wrote an article for the Daily Maverick titled: 
#CapeWaterGate: In the end, what was Day Zero all about?, ‘Day Zero’ as a campaign was 
introduced in November 2017, but importantly, Davis points out that the announcement of 
‘Day Zero’ coincided with Resolve Communications (RC) being hired by the DA. According 
to the author, RC was hired because it “offered specific skills and vast experience in 
government crisis communication strategies and behaviour change” (Davis, 2018: 3). I had 
heard from several people that there was an ‘advertising agency’ hired to help the City with 
the campaign, but I figured it was more in the role of graphic designers and content creation. 
After hearing about RC, I decided to have a look at their website. I was surprised to find that 
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below their logo on their home page there were three statements: “Lobbying & Advocacy”, 
“Reputation Management”, and “Strategic Communications”. Below these statements, there is 
an image of a megaphone surrounded by the words “The Agitator Model”.  
 
 
Figure 1: Home page of Resolve Communications 
Source: (https://resolvecommunications.co.za/) 
 
According to their website, under the “What we do” page, the following is stated:  
 
We influence government policy, at all levels, to align with your business needs. We 
change people’s minds about you. We take your issue to the heart of the public debate. 
We are at your side throughout the media storm (Resolve Communications, Accessed 
August 2020).  
 
I found this quite fascinating. If you get the impression that this firm focuses on government 
in particular, you would not be wrong. Their executive chairman is the former leader “of the 
opposition” (another name for the DA) according to his RC biography. His name might be 
familiar: Tony Leon. When I first heard about this, I shrugged the information off because I 
assumed that the DA had hired an advertising agency, which would make sense in terms of 
having a professional agency handling the crisis communication. What I found odd was that 
when I looked into it, the DA did not hire an advertising agency. They hired a professional 
lobbyist. If you look under the ‘Lobbying and Advocacy’ section on their webpage they write 
that “We navigate our clients through the political landscape with tailor-made plans aimed at 
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changing the political opinion and winning public support”. Why was it necessary for the DA 
to hire RC to assist in the management of the water crisis? According to Rebecca Davis, this 
might have something to do with a Request for Information (RFI) released on the 19th of June 
2017. The RFI in question was about water augmentation schemes, which stated that the DA 
had the goal of having the first (desalination) plant up and running by the end of August 2017 
(2018: 2).  
 
The DA’s announcement of the desalination plants was met with mixed responses. Building 
and maintaining desalination plants is expensive. The DA estimated that the three plants 
(Monwabisi, Strandfontein, and the V&A Waterfront) would cost upwards of R240 million per 
plant. The plants would provide much needed relief, but they would not provide the required 
amount of water the city needs per day. When operating at full capacity, the plants would 
produce only 12 million litres per day. This, according to Mark Rountree, was only 3% of the 
city’s 500 million litre daily need (2019: 1-2). Of course, the mixed reactions to these plans 
played out on social media. At the time of the crisis, Mmusi Maimane was still the leader of 
the DA, and on the 24th of January 2018 he entered into a less-than-friendly exchange with 
someone on Twitter about the cost of the plants, which drew significant criticism from various 
stakeholders. Maimane tried to argue that the cost was too much for the city alone to cover, 
and that national government needed to provide assistance. A local businesswoman, Magda 
Wierzycka, tweeted “Apparently @MmusiMaimane indicated that desalination of sea water 
for #DefeatDayZero would be 30% of the city’s budget. Misleading. The capital expenditure 
of such a venture would be spread out over time and wouldn’t be hit in a single year. Why are 
you lying Mr. Maimane?”. Maimane responded “I said that desalination is expensive. Large 
scale facilities cost up to R15 billion (which is 1/3 of CPT's annual budget). No city can afford 
such facilities on its own. Especially when their provision is outside its legal mandate. 
Assistance would need to come from nat. govt.”. Wierzycka retorted with “I was quoted 120 
million euros for a plant that would supply 100,000,000 l per day. 11 months to construct. That 
is R1.8bn. Double that for unexpected expenditure. SAA bail out was R10bn. Please stop lying 
to us.”. Wierzycka then goes on to Tweet that “We need basic level solution. Funded by issuing 
municipal bonds. I am sure there are multiple answers and solutions. The problem is time. 
Drought is not going away. Neither is climate change. Or population growth.” At this point in 
the exchange, a Twitter user with the user handle @abelmike Tweeted: “But a large scale plant 
to supply the city properly is 8 to 12 times that daily volume in your tweet, if you look [a]t the 
pre-drought usage & the size & growth of the population. So multiply your number by even 6-
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8 times to have a full solution and you are closer to R12-15 bn”. Following on, Phumzile Van 
Damme, who at the time was the DA spokesperson, retweeted @abelmike’s tweet to 
Wierzycka adding “I see @Magda_Wierzycka has not responded to this. Facts matter.”  
 
This interaction on Twitter demonstrates the complexities of engaging on social media. In the 
above section, I have highlighted only four people’s exchanges. In Maimane’s initial response 
to Wierzycka, there are 75 other comments, and then there were further replies to some of those 
75 comments. How do elected officials decide who to engage with? It often has a lot to do with 
who is on that above-mentioned ‘Top’ page, or at least who has significant engagement on 
their posts. Social media has a built-in popularity factor. The more engagement you have on 
your profile, the more likely people are to see it. The more followers you have, the more your 
Tweets get shared or engaged with.  
 
The algorithms that make all of this possible may seem fairly harmless at first glance, but in 
instances where there is a crisis that is referred to as a ‘great leveller’, they become problematic. 
If you have a system that prioritises certain voices or profiles, you create an echo chamber. In 
politics, public perception is crucial. The margins for error are very small when your post can 
reach millions of followers instantly. So, in times of crisis, where perception is even more 
crucial because politicians need people to trust them in order to get them to act in a particular 
way, some assistance might be needed. And in the case of the DA, this assistance came at the 
cost of over half a million Rand. RC were paid R658 000 to provide ‘strategic advice’ with the 
aim of improving the CoCT’s crisis communication (de Villiers, 2018). When asked about this 
contract by News24, the City said that it was “a vast undertaking to develop programmes that 
can reach each and every resident. Resolve provides guidance on how best this can be 
achieved” (de Villiers, 2018). The hiring of RC was apparently not only suspicious to me; in 
the same article referred to above, the CoCT was asked about the conflict of interest that might 
exist when a lobbying group headed by the former leader of the party is managing the official 
crisis communication. RC responded by saying “[t]his question has frankly absurd inference: 
that the party-political background of two principals in the company should qualify or 
disqualify that company from doing any work” (de Villiers, 2018). However, RC is not merely 
a public relations firm – they are a lobbying firm. Which means that their undertaking is to 
shift the public perception in favour of their clients. But the public perception they are 
attempting to shift here is the mismanagement of a water crisis that unfairly impacts lower-
income communities, which in the context of Cape Town, are largely Black and Brown 
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communities. It is also fair to say that hiring this type of specialized service is not available to 
everyone. If we are to believe that the water crisis was the ‘great leveller’, then those who live 
with chronic crisis everyday should have benefitted from RC’s public relation work for the 
DA. However, there is no evidence to support the idea that those communities have benefitted 
to date.  
 
Nick Shepherd writes that “clean drinking water is a complex object, constructed at the point 
of the intersection between natural systems, cultural imaginaries, and social, political and 
economic forces and interests” (2019: 1). ‘Day Zero’ is an interesting portal into this concern 
because access to water is integral for human life. In 2017, water became deeply political 
because it brought social and economic injustice to the forefront of the conversation. 
Mediating who and how water would be supplied when the taps ran dry showed the 
fragmented nature of the city. The 2011 census found that Cape Town had 1.068 million 
households. Of those households, 12% (roughly 124 000) were informal structures. Of the 
1.068 million households, close to 36% lived below the poverty line, which in 2011 referred 
to people who earned less than R501 (lower bound poverty line) or R779 (upper bound 
poverty line) per month. In 2019, these respective poverty lines were R801 and R1 227 per 
month respectively (Statistics South Africa, 2019: 3-4, Shepard, 2019: 4). Furthermore, 97% 
of households were dependent on municipal water provision, and 10% of households made 
use of ‘alternative’ toilets such as chemical, bucket, or ‘other’ structures (Shepherd, 2019: 4-
5). In Cape Town, you do not have to look very hard to see the economic and social inequality. 
What Nick Shepard describes above is the chronic crises that poor communities face and how 
it is treated as unexceptional or normal. However, when the threat of a similar condition (like 
needing to que for a daily ration of water) becomes a concern for the middle class, a sudden 
shift of attention and narrative happens that prioritises the voices of those who ‘have’. The 
DA’s social media campaign was part of this narrative and largely aimed to address the 
behaviour and concerns of the middle class. The digital and print awareness posters often 
focused on how much water a dishwasher and washing machine uses, or how long your 
shower should be (#DefeatDayZero, n.d). What is neglected by this social media approach, 
however, is the fact that in poor communities across the Western Cape, many households do 
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not have running water or a flush toilet in their homes. Information about dish washers and 
washing machines and showers are not relevant to these households.3 
 
The City still functions on a map where low-income households are pushed to the periphery 
and wealth is displayed and celebrated at the centre. It is only when you start to look at the 
space in between that you see how people try to claim back space. There are tents set up under 
bridges and in parks. Informal structures pop up overnight in crevices between roads and 
homes. People try to claim back a piece of land, hoping that proximity to the economic hub 
will allow for better opportunity. The connection between these images and the water crisis 
may not seem clear, but they are at the core of how we need to look at the city’s infrastructure. 
In Cape Town (as in many other South African towns and cities), social injustice is deeply 
rooted. You cannot look at Cape Town’s city planning or management without addressing 
social injustice or trying to understand how social inequality operates in the city. And you 
cannot address social injustice until you address the history of that injustice.  
 
For these reasons, it is crucial to consider how the DA approached crisis management, and 
who was prioritised in the process of managing the water shortage. In traditional crisis 
management, the first step is to do triage. To evaluate what damage has been done and try 
predicting what further damage can be expected. The drought response needed a centralized 
response tool that could provide rapid information, tips, and directives with little cost or time 
drain on the government. Social media was an ideal tool for this. However, social media can 
also highlight who is not included in these narratives. What is mentioned and what is omitted 
in social media posts speaks directly to who is being targeted and what information is deemed 
necessary to reach a wide audience. In the last four years, there have been major developments 
in social media’s role in crisis management. A few years ago, Facebook created a tool on their 
platform that people could use to mark themselves ‘Safe’ during disasters and crises. 
Although less practical for slow crises like a drought, the tool has proven popular in instances 
 
3 Social Justice Coalition. n.d. Sanitation - Social Justice Coalition. [online] Available at: 
<https://sjc.org.za/campaigns/sanitation> [Accessed 20 October 2020]. 
Lali, V. (2018). Hundreds Share One Working Toilet In Khayelitsha Neighbourhood | News24. [online] 
News24. Available at: <https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/hundreds-share-one-working-
toilet-in-khayelitsha-neighbourhood-20180719> [Accessed 20 October 2020]. 
Lali, V. (2018). Two Toilets For Dozens Of Residents In Khayelitsha. [online] TimesLIVE. Available at: 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-08-03-two-toilets-for-dozens-of-residents-in-




such as severe hurricanes or tornadoes. It has also been used in heart-breaking instances of 
terrorist attacks and mass shootings.   
 
Under ‘Crisis Response’ on Facebook, there is a ‘Safety Check’ feature which “allows people 
to quickly share that they're safe during a crisis with friends and family and helps them connect 
with people they care about” (Facebook, 2020). This feature is only activated when Facebook 
is alerted to the danger. The process is explained as follows:  
 
When an incident such as an earthquake, hurricane, mass shooting or building collapse 
occurs where people might be in danger, global crisis reporting agencies alert Facebook. 
If a lot of people in the affected area are posting about the incident, Safety Check will be 
activated and those people in the area may receive a notification from Facebook to mark 
themselves safe. People who click the Safety Check notification will also be able to see if 
any of their friends are in the affected area or have marked themselves safe. (Facebook, 
2020).  
 
Facebook now has an entire resource page dedicated to crisis response and how the platform 
handles these situations. This goes beyond creating a tool to enable people to let their family 
and friends know of the state of their safety. Facebook has designed a policy for addressing 
crisis situations based on how people use their platform in these instances. They have 
guidelines on what may be posted under crisis responses, how to go about helping in these 
situations, and what the community guidelines are. But this approach to crisis response 
highlights the neglect that is shown when crisis is slow and chronic, as is the context of many 
communities in Cape Town. There is no safety check for those who, as Nixon writes, face 
“[v]iolence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is 
dispersed across time and space” (2011: 2). The type of violence that occurs away from the 
middle and upper class. There is no function that allows people to immediately alert people to 
the chronic crises faced in their communities. In order to utilise social media in these contexts, 
people or groups are required to utilise their own autonomy and following to try bring attention 
to marginalized communities.  
 
Roshan et al. argues that organisations can use social media to respond directly to stakeholders, 
which helps them understand the stakeholder’s crisis needs which may enhance the 
organisation’s reputation (2016: 350). However, this direct method of communication may 
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increase an organisation’s vulnerability during a crisis if they are not perceived to have 
managed the crisis well. In their study, they found that despite the importance of social media 
in this age, businesses still find it difficult to navigate using social media for crisis 
communication. The study outlines three positive benefit categories of social media use for 
organisations. The first benefit is that it allows organisations to have active and engaged 
relationships with their stakeholders, enabling them to listen and respond directly. The second 
benefit is access to real time data created by their stakeholders. Organisations can also do 
research and receive feedback about their service in a cost-effective and timely manner. The 
third benefit is that social media provides a cost-efficient way to communicate with 
stakeholders (Roshan et al, 2016: 350 -351). With respect to the Cape Town drought, social 
media was an important tool for the DA, and as mentioned above played an important role in 
getting people to change their water consumption behaviour. However, it was also where the 
DA received the most backlash and negative attention from the public. This negative attention 
often stemmed from people who were already dissatisfied by the service delivery of the City 
and felt that they had not been included in the narrative around the water crisis.  
 
An article written by Micheal Andreas Etter and Anne Vestergaard looked into how social 
media was used by an NGO, Greenpeace, to publicly call out Nestlé for their use of palm oil, 
which had contributed to severe deforestation in Australia and Asia in 2010. The social media 
responses used in this instance are similar to those used by the CoCT during the water crisis. 
Greenpeace’s campaign was deemed successful in getting a wide public reaction and managing 
to use social media petitions to get traditional media to cover the story (2015: 163). Nestlé also 
used social media to respond to accusations and address the public regarding the campaign. 
Nestlé focused their response on the role of the industry and actors within the industry. Their 
responses were largely focused on remedying the situation and outlined what was and what 
would be done to combat the issues raised by Greenpeace. However, the study noted that 
“Nestlé refrained entirely from addressing the question of cause - who or what had been 
responsible for bringing about the problem of deforestation - just as barely any mention was 
made of the consequences of deforestation” (Etter & Vestergaard, 2015: 168). The strategy 
was to apologize, refrain from issuing blame and taking responsibility, and to avoid addressing 
what the cause was exactly. By refraining from issuing blame and not addressing the 
circumstances around deforestation, Nestlé avoided making statements that could undermine 
the company’s credibility. In terms of SCC theory, this strategy allows stakeholders to feel 
validated with an apology but to still regard the company as having a good reputation. The 
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NGO’s social media posts focused on remedial responsibility and was noticeably less 
concerned with analysing and discussing the exact causes of the deforestation. The NGO also 
focused their efforts on Nestlé and did not address other organisations who were also part of 
the problem.  
 
When looking at the NGO’s strategy, the authors found that Greenpeace associated 
responsibility with the public rather than Nestlé. The NGO used a shaming discourse to 
emphasize that consumers had a responsibility to not support Nestlé, rather than directly trying 
to change industry practices (Etter & Vestergaard, 2015: 168-167). The public largely 
responded by focusing on Nestlé and did not pay much attention to other factors. In the three 
actors’ responses, all neglected to address the political actors that may be contributing to or 
responsible for the issues. According to the authors, “Facebook users pay little attention to 
causes and consequences of deforestation, while focussing almost exclusively on remedial 
responsibility on what – must be done to provide a solution” (Etter & Vestergaard, 2015: 169). 
The online public demanded that Nestlé take responsibility for the deforestation and did not 
view themselves as the group who could provide a solution by boycotting the industry or 
challenging government to implement regulations. The public response is framed as ‘protest 
discourse’ which entails demanding action without enquiring about their own role or 
responsibility in the crisis. This study helps contextualise the engagement that occurs between 
the three actors. Firstly, the organisation that is viewed as responsible for the crisis, secondly a 
group that acts as a watchdog to bring awareness to the actions of the organisation, and thirdly, 
the public and their reaction to the organisation.  
 
In the case of Cape Town’s water crisis, similar dynamics were at play. Throughout the 
#DayZero campaign, there were groups that countered or pressured the DA regarding their 
actions. Various NGOs and activist groups used social media to voice their issues with the 
handling of the drought. Some of these groups already existed pre-drought and had a record 
with government accountability work (such as the Social Justice Coalition). Other groups 
formed specifically to address drought specific issues (such as the Water Crisis Coalition). The 
focus of these groups was largely to raise awareness around inequality and how the DA’s plans 
often seemed to neglect or further marginalise the poor. More informal groups also surfaced 
on social media platforms such as Facebook and Whatsapp. Social media became a key tool in 
drawing attention to the voices of people who were on the margins of the water crisis because 
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their lives did not dramatically change during the drought. For residents and activists alike, it 
offered a platform to problematize the ‘great equaliser’ narrative.  
 
When you go onto the Water Crisis Coalition’s (WCC) website, there are six blocks titled: 
Context, Articles, Documents, Stories, Action, and Calendar. Under the ‘Context’ block reads: 
“The City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Government messed up big time. In fact, all 
tiers of Government is complicit through lack of foresight and mismanagement of our water 
resources”. Once you click on the box you are taken to a page that encourages users to post 
information, resources, and opinions in order to describe the context of the crisis. These posts 
are linked to their Facebook account. When I visited their Facebook page in early 2020, they 
had 2 970 likes and 3 156 followers, but they had not posted on the page since the 16th of 
October 2018. From their Facebook page and website, it is difficult to tell for certain what the 
WCC’s aim was. There is no ‘About us’ page or description. There is no manifesto or intention 
statement. But from their posts on Facebook, it seems that their focus is to raise awareness 
surrounding the water crisis and the impact it was having in low-income areas. In their posts, 
they frequently mention more of the chronic conditions of crisis than what the media narrative 
covered. They bring up “Decent housing for all” and “scrapping of all arrears and fines” – the 
latter relating to the Water Management Devices and the high tariffs since the water crisis 
‘began’ (Water Crisis Coalition Facebook page, 2018). Despite the focus of the WCC on the 
water crisis, the group make reference to housing issues and tariffs as these are conditions that 
already put strain on poor and low-income communities, which existed before the drought 
occurred and still persists today. At the bottom of their webpage there are two contact numbers. 
I decided to call one of the numbers. However, after several attempts to contact both, I still had 
no success. The Facebook page remains dormant and it seems that the WCC has given up on 
their project, despite the fact that people are still experiencing the financial and social burdens 
of the water management devices. The consequences of an unfair levy system are still present 
in lower-income communities in Cape Town.  
 
Several Facebook and Whatsapp groups pertaining to the water crisis shared information 
relatively quickly, and they were usually community groups. The more informal groups were 
not always focused on representing an underserved community and did not really get involved 
in policymaking or activism. Rather, they functioned as somewhat of a closed network that 
involved the sharing of articles, images, and do-it-yourself tips on how to go off the grid or 
how to install water storage tanks. Throughout 2018, I was invited to several of these groups, 
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mostly on Whatsapp and Facebook. The most prominent on these was a group called Water 
Press Riyaz Rawoot (WPRR). This group was (and still is today) administered by Riyaz 
Rawoot, who was introduced earlier in this paper. At the time I was invited, there were over 
60 participants in the group. At the time of writing, 42 remained. I was added to the group soon 
after my first visit to the Kildare Road spring, which was also the first time I met Riyaz.  
 
At the time, I was living in Stellenbosch and could only visit the site every other week, so the 
group was helpful for staying informed of the happenings around the spring. Conversation on 
the group was mostly intermittent, but on some days, notifications would come in rapidly and 
my phone would vibrate constantly for some time. This was usually spurred on by a message 
or event that upset the group. One such instance was when the CoCT closed the spring, and a 
member posted a picture of the cemented area. Understandably, the group felt strongly about 
this. One member wrote “Didn't expect anything less. Total obliteration. And one of many 
initiatives to keep out and disconnect people from where our parents and gr[an] parents came 
from”. Another wrote “It’s about absolute control. The city thinks that is the best way to govern. 
They no longer care about our input. They ‘know’ what’s best for the people, and we must just 
trust that and keep quiet”. I spoke to Riyaz about this day a few weeks later. He told me that 
he was not surprised by what the CoCT had done. But he also spoke about being sad and how 
much he valued the community of water users that came to the spring. I asked why he started 
the WhatsApp group, and he told me that it made sense from an activist perspective. It was the 
most effective forum to spread news and mobilise people.  
 
The group from this point out began to decrease in activity. There is nothing that can be done 
about the spring’s closure now. I went back to Kildare Road a month or so later. In stark 
contrast to my earlier visits, the road was deserted. There were no water porters rushing back 
and forth, no cars ramped up pavements, and no buzz of activity as I turned the corner and 
walked to the end of the cul-de-sac. I had never been here alone. I walked to the end of the road 
and looked at the tree where the petition to keep the spring open had once hung. It had been 
taken down. Where the PVC pipe used to be was now a concrete slab. I felt strange standing 
there. If someone was watching me, they would have seen a woman staring at concrete. But I 
like to think that for the people who knew what this space was just a few weeks prior, I would 
look like many of them. Someone who was confused and mourning a space that was once so 
vibrant. Where people had stood in lines and made casual conversation while waiting for their 
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turn to collect water. I walked away feeling dejected and I struggled to write about the 
experience in my field notebook.  
 
The Whatsapp group provides an interesting lens into how social media is used in times of 
crisis. Since the closure of the spring, the WPRR group has been fairly inactive. Every now 
and then, someone will share a news article pertaining to water restrictions, gentrification, or a 
holiday well wish. More and more people have left and Riyaz’s ‘only water issues’ messages 
have popped up less frequently when conversation goes astray. The ‘profile’ picture of the 
group is a sign posted by the spring that reads “Closed. Council is reducing the flow”. While 
combing through the chat history looking for messages or article links, I wonder what the 
purpose of the group is now. I wonder about Riyaz’s intentions for the group now that it is no 
longer an activist platform. The WPRR group is to me a symbol of the water crisis in many 
ways. It provided a space for a diverse group of people to come together and discuss ideas or 
plans around saving the spring, or to just discuss and share news and events around the drought. 
At its peak, the drought was extremely active as news and information was shared rapidly. But 
as the winter season came and the spring was closed, that activity and activism came to a halt. 
This trajectory was similar across other social media platforms. Posts about the drought or the 
#DayZero campaign decreased and then stopped all together as time went by. New crises 
popped up and the days of counting litres and measuring consumption, and the impending 
dread of running out of water washed away with the 2018 winter. On the 21st of December 
2018, the following exchange happened on the group:  
 
Participant A: Is it true that the water collection point on Newlands Main Road (that 
replaced the others) is closed for renovations? Does anyone know how long it will be 
closed for? 
Participant B: Yes. Just now on Cape Talk. [The spring] [w]as closed [a] couple of 
days ago for maintenance to be reopened today. Still closed at this time. 
Participant B: Cape Talk: Plumbers that had to do the maintenance at Newlands 
springs are on strike - hence it is still closed. 
Participant C: Surely more lies... They just don't want people to be collecting 'free' 
water... 
 
This exchange is a nutshell of the water crisis. For most, the conversation and concern was 
focused on access to water. For others, it was about losing the right of access to a particular 
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public space with a long history, the Kildare Road Spring. Members of the Islamic community 
felt that their rights were being trampled on. The Kildare Road spring was a significant site for 
this community. They believe that an Iman blessed the spring. Some of the families that had 
been collecting water there in 2017/2018 had been doing so for decades. It was a family 
tradition.  
 
Not all responses to the crisis stressed the value of community and cooperation. In certain 
instances, several people on social media had accused residents of informal settlements for 
wasting water. On certain social media groups, people frequently blamed taxi drivers for 
washing their minibuses with hose pipes or using several buckets of water. On the 31st of 
December 2017, a user posted about a conversation where someone told them that they were 
filling their pool with portable water because “they pay rates and taxes”. The user went on to 
preach about how the drought is a societal issue and everyone has a part to play in preventing 
‘Day Zero’. The post received considerable attention (at the time of writing there were 129 
comments and 37 shares). However, what caught my attention was the following comment left 
on the post: “Yes [name redacted] and THAT is exactly why I get so upset when I see taxi 
drivers and those in informal settlements just [don’t] give a damn. Why should they!??? Not 
their problem!! Cause we will suffer for their stupidity and pay for their arrogants!! (sic)”. On 
a different post I come across this engagement: 
 
User 1: We were driving through a township called Langa today and two places people 
were washing cars.   and when I mentioned to the guys in the taxi I was driving with, 
about the water crisis, the one guy responded the water shortage is not true. It is the 
government's way of wanting to get more money out of the people. I had to convince 
him there is a water crisis and if each one of us [don’t] do our bit soon there will be no 
water.   My concern there are [a lot] of people thinking that way and they are under 
the impression there is an endless supply of water.   Is enough being done to create 
awareness and educate the masses?   
User 2 (responding to comment): They are used to endless supply of freebies 
 
On a different post someone commented, “Yet another waste of time & money... hope it is 
across the board & not just for the rate payers. Try the townships, squatter camps, taps run 




These are just three examples of many that I found on this public Facebook group. None of the 
three original posts mentioned taxis or informal settlements. I found the language use of these 
comments upsetting, but not entirely surprising. The Othering of the poor in South Africa is 
not new. The instances of blaming this Other, and the practice of shifting blame to another 
group, is also not surprising. The leaders in provincial government do it too. The assumptions 
made in the comments show the underlying racial and class prejudice that so often codes our 
language. The “theys”, “thems”, and “theirs” is a common feature of disassociation between 
groups. The language of Othering is found frequently on social media, as is the blame game or 
blame politics (Alorainy et al, 2019: 1-4, Cappellini, et al, 2019: 429-430). Reading these posts 
on social media made me think about the earlier engagement between Maimane and 
Wierzycka. On Twitter, there is little room for nuance as the character count is restricted to 
280. However, both these Tweets neglected to touch on the biggest factor behind ‘Day Zero’ - 
the middle and upper classes were using too much water. The focus on desalination as a 
solution to the water crisis was still not getting to the root of the issue. Water consumption by 
ordinary people was unsustainable at the time. Another issue ignored in these conversations is 
the fact that a water (along with sanitation and infrastructure) crisis had been happening all 
along.  
 
When it comes to understanding how social media is used by politicians, Donald Trump 
immediately comes to mind. Trump’s use of Twitter in particular has been written about 
extensively as his social media behaviour has broken away from what was considered the 
‘etiquette’ of social media use by political leaders. Trump has managed to use Twitter to spread 
and build his right-wing agenda (Kreis, 2017: 2). Trump’s use of social media has managed to 
cross over to traditional media as his Tweets become the news itself, which has frequently led 
to news coverage focusing on the Tweet rather than the event being Tweeted about. This has 
also allowed for this agenda to spread to wider audiences as individuals in older generations 
tend to not have relatively a large online presence. A language tool that Trump often deploys 
is the ‘rhetoric of exclusion’, through which he identifies a group as the Other (Kreis, 2017: 3). 
Populist politics often prefer communicating on social media platforms as it allows them to 
have “simple and direct communication with the people in order to deliver an unmediated 
message. By engaging in direct communication with their followers, the populist actors 
circumvent the media as gatekeepers. They can thus present their message without mediation.” 
(Casero-Ripollés, Feenstra, and Tormey, 2016 quoted in Kreis, 2017: 4). The mention of an 
Other in Trump’s Tweets is important because his political campaign and agenda is to “Make 
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America Great Again”, which requires a villain or the proverbial ‘bad guy’ that he needs to 
save America from. For right-wing Americans, this villain or bad guy is usually a person of 
colour, immigrants, refuges, Muslims, homosexuals, and other marginalised groups. In 
February 2017, Trump tweets “The threat from radical Islamic terrorism is very real, just look 
at what is happening in Europe and the Middle-East. Courts must act fast!”. However, the 
criminalizing of these groups did not only start during his campaign for presidency. In June 
2015, he Tweeted “Sadly, the overwhelming amount of violent crime in our major cities is 
committed by blacks and Hispanics - a tough subject - must be discussed.”. This language is 
Othering 101.  
 
The idea that a core, dominant group is in danger and that a marginalised group that acts or 
looks different is the source of the danger is often posed by Trump’s rhetoric (Alorainy et al, 
2019: 1-4). If we go back and look at the posts on the Facebook group, we see echoes of this 
language. People quickly identify an ‘Other’ that is to blame or is responsible for the wasting 
of water. Although the Facebook users can identify that there is a threat to their daily lives 
(water running out), they perceive this threat to be external and thus the fault of an outside 
group. Rather than discussing the role that middle-class households play, the blame is shifted 
onto people who have already limited access to water. Rather than discussing the significant 
amount of water consumed by large washing machines and single toilet flushes, the 
conversation is focused on the person who washes clothes in an outside basin with the tap 
running, or the mini-bus taxi driver who uses a few buckets of water to keep their vehicles 
clean. The shifting of blame can be observed in nearly every aspect of the water crisis. The 
CoCT blamed the national government for poor-planning and lack of budget. The national 
government blamed the DA for poor-planning and for mudslinging. Residents blamed the 
government or other residents. Some blamed the farmers. Some blamed climate change and 
ineffective governance of the ‘new normal’. Social media became the main platform for these 
grievances.4 People vented or accused various role-players on their platforms in ways that were 
unlikely to happen face-to-face. A term for this phenomena has been coined: keyboard 
 
4 Evans, J., 2018. Day Zero Is A Myth, Say Protesters Looking To Fill Up At Zille's Residence | News24. 
[online] News24. Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/day-zero-is-a-myth-say-
protesters-looking-to-fill-up-at-zilles-residence-20180212 
Kreis, R. (2017) The ‘Tweet Politics’ of President Trump. Journal of Language and Politics. [Online] 16 (4), 
607–618.Masilela, B., 2019. 'Service Delivery Protests Are Part Of The ANC's Plans To Discredit The DA'. 




warriors.5 According to Wiktionary, this term is defined as follows: (informal, derogatory) A 
person who behaves aggressively and/or in an inflammatory manner in online text-based 
discussion media, but at the same time does not behave similarly in real life, potentially due to 
cowardice, introversion or shyness (keyboard warrior – Wiktionary, 2020). Social media has 
made it easier to air grievances, but this is not always a positive trait.  
 
People engage politicians more frequently about their dissatisfaction than praise. As people 
moved on with their lives following Cape Town’s water crisis, the moment of outrage faded 
and daily life continued. As I conclude this chapter, there is outrage on Facebook and Twitter 
about the level four national lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. No one is talking about 
the water crisis anymore. All the social media posts that I have discussed in this chapter are 
now archival. They happened at least several months ago, if not two years ago. This is 
something I both dislike and like about social media. It moves with us. It documents whatever 
we are currently facing as a society. But as quickly as we forget, it stores away. The posts about 
‘Day Zero’ are buried under other crises that have occurred. You have to scroll further and 
further down in the search content to find what you are looking for. Social media may provide 
more agency for people to create and document their own narratives and experience, but 
ultimately it is vulnerable to the same transience that characterises traditional media: news 
moves on. Yet for those who live with chronic and enduring crisis, ‘Day Zero’ continues.  
 
 
5 Cappellini, B. et al. (2019) Shouting on social media? A borderscapes perspective on a contentious 
hashtag. Technological forecasting & social change. [Online] 145428–437. 
Alorainy, W. et al. (2019) ‘The Enemy Among Us’: Detecting Cyber Hate Speech with Threats-based Othering 





Figure 2: The sign posted at the Kildare Road spring announcing the closure, and the 
profile picture of the Water Press Riyaz Rawoot Whatsapp group. 





On the 20th of October 2020, the City of Cape Town announced that water restrictions would 
be lifted for the 2020/2021 budget period starting in November 2020.6 The following statement 
was made by Xanthea Limberg after the announcement was made public: “Cape Town’s recent 
drought crisis made it clear that it’s necessary for the City to build water security by investing 
in future water sources as outlined in our Water Strategy” (IOL, 2020). However, as this 
research has shown, “building water security” is not equally attainable for everyone. For those 
who live in conditions of chronic crisis, access to water has and still remains an issue. The DA 
was proud to announce that ‘Day Zero’ had been avoided in 2018, but for many poor and low-
income communities in the city, ‘Day Zero’ had been an enduring daily experience long before 
the onset of the drought. This is the reality of the water crisis in Cape Town, as well as other 
 
6 Business Tech. (2020). Cape Town Lifts Water Restrictions – Announces New Prices From November. [online] 
Businesstech.co.za. Available at: <https://businesstech.co.za/news/property/442188/cape-town-lifts-water-
restrictions-announces-new-prices-from-november/> [Accessed 23 October 2020] 
 IOL. (2020). No More Water Restrictions For Cape Town, But Residents Will Face Water-Wise Tariff. [online] 
Iol.co.za. Available at: <https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/no-more-water-restrictions-for-cape-town-but-




areas of South Africa. Water crisis is not only determined by climate change or low rainfall 
seasons; rather, these events exacerbate already existing crises which marginalised 
communities live with on a day-to-day basis. The key difference is how this is covered by the 
media. There is no duration counter for how many days people in informal settlements have 
been collecting water in plastic containers.  
 
Vigh’s (2008) concept of chronic crisis has been crucial in theorizing how the water crisis, and 
the DA’s management thereof, did not address the already existing crisis amongst a large 
proportion of the population, and how this condition continues to persist. In the midst of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, this concept of chronic crisis becomes even more important to consider 
as it is again this group who are most vulnerable. I reflect on the fact that in late March 2020, 
a strict national lockdown was implemented. This lockdown restricted movement in South 
Africa in order to protect people from contracting and spreading the virus. However, many still 
needed to walk to communal sanitation points, either to access their daily water or to make use 
of communal toilets. The media often published stories of how the lockdown was ‘broken’ or 
‘ignored’ in townships during the most stringent stages of it.7 One article even states that 
“[t]here is not one face mask or bottle of hand sanitizer in sight. Nothing, in fact, that would 
give away that the country is entering its fourth week of a nationwide coronavirus lockdown.” 
The article goes on: “‘They [the government] tell us we have to stay at home, but we're using 
communal toilets and communal taps, and the shops are far from here,’ says Qezo, whose 
organization is trying to raise awareness about infection prevention. ‘We'll do our best. But the 
virus will spread quickly’” (Trenchard, 2020). This type of reporting, alongside the evictions 
that the CoCT ordered during the lockdown in April 2020, shows clearly that the reality that 
poor communities face is not comparable to that of middle to upper-class households.8 Very 
rarely do these communities have one crisis to worry about. Due to their under-resourced nature 
and the presence of structural violence, these communities are forced to live with multiple 
 
7  Trenchard, T. (2020). NPR Choice Page. [online] Npr.org. Available at: 
<https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/21/837437715/photos-lockdown-in-the-worlds-most-
unequal-country> [Accessed 23 October 2020]. 
8 Nortier, C. (2020). CORONAVIRUS DAILY DIGEST #21: Khayelitsha Residents Pushed Out Of Homes And 
Into Conflict With Law Enforcement. [online] Daily Maverick. Available at: 
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-14-khayelitsha-residents-pushed-out-of-homes-and-into-
conflict-with-law-enforcement/> [Accessed 23 October 2020]. 
Mandonyana, M. (2020). Is The South African Lockdown Effective For Townships Like Khayelitsha? – 
71Point4. [online] 71point4.com. Available at: <https://www.71point4.com/is-the-south-african-lockdown-




simultaneous crises, ranging from homelessness, food and money insecurity, lack of service 
delivery, and limited access to resources including water, sanitation, and electricity. The idea 
that the water crisis acted as the ‘great equaliser’ neglects to take this reality into account.  
 
This project has shown that traditional media narratives are often created depending on the 
audience and are not inclusive of the reality of poor and low-income communities. These 
narratives neglect to include the endemic nature of crisis and instead focus on more sensational 
and temporary experiences of crisis. Moreover, this project has argued that social media can 
play a key role in highlighting narratives not included in traditional media coverage. The 
project has further shown that the management of the water crisis in Cape Town highlighted 
existing inequalities between middle- and low-income households, and how this particularly 
played out in the DA’s use of social media. It showed how social media is often used as a way 
to directly engage with elected officials to voice complaints or raise awareness of the 
experiences and realities of people not covered by traditional media. This project has also 
shown that, in moments of crisis, social media is used not only to mobilize and share 
information in both closed and open networks, but also to engage in a behaviour of othering in 
order to discuss or find blame. By conducting participant observation and in-person formal and 
informal interviews with individuals at the Kildare Road spring, it became clear that many did 
not feel like their experiences were being acknowledged by the media or the government. 
Participants often expressed that they made use of the spring to circumvent both the water 
tariffs and increasing restrictions. Although this research is focused on the water crisis in Cape 
Town, its findings can be applied to other regions in the Western Cape and nationally, given 
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